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The Model Control Share Act is the Best
State Takeover Law Alternative
EvAN M. KJELLENBERG*

I.

INTRODUCTION

The question is no longer whether or not a state should adopt a
corporate takeover law. The dynamic events and changing circumstances over the past year have dramatically altered the takeover
playing field and require new analyses and solutions.
The landmark United States Supreme Court decision in CTS
Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of America,' in April 1987, shocked most
corporate and securities lawyers. The Supreme Court in the CTS case
held that the Indiana Control Share Acquisition Chapter 2 was neither
preempted by federal law,3 the Williams Act, 4 nor invalid as unreasonably burdening interstate commerce.' The Supreme Court found
that the Indiana Chapter is intended to provide independent shareholders of domestic corporations, meeting certain criteria, the power
* Partner, McBride Baker & Coles, Chicago, Illinois. A.B., Dartmouth
College and Amos Tuck School of Business Administration; J.D., University of
Chicago. Mr. Kjellenberg is one of seven members of the American Bar Association
serving on the Joint Committee with the North American Securities Administrators'
Association, which drafted the Model Control Share Act. He served as Chairman
(1981-85) of the Illinois Secretary of State's Corporation Acts Advisory Committee
which drafted the Illinois Business Corporation Act of 1983. Mr. Kjellenberg has
also served as Chairman of the Corporation Law Committee of the Chicago Bar
Association and Chairman of the Corporation and Securities Law Section Council
of the Illinois State Bar Association.
1. 107 S. Ct. 1637 (1987).
2. IND. CODE ANN. § 23-1-42 (West Supp. 1987). Sixteen states have enacted
a form of the Indiana Control Share Acquisition Chapter, some of which are more
pro-management than Indiana. See the Survey of State Control Share Acquisition
Statutes Prepared for ABA/NASAA Joint Committee of Model Control Share Act
attached as Appendix 2 to this article. Ohio's recent legislative attempt to protect its
native Federated Department Stores (a Delaware corporation) survived only a few
days after enactment when it was held unconstitutional by a Cincinnati federal court.
Campeau Corp. v. Federated Depart. Stores, 1988 FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) § 93,650
(S.D. Ohio Feb. 5, 1988).
3. CTS, 107 S. Ct. at 1644-48.
4. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78m(d) & (e) and 78n(d)-(f) (1986).
5. CTS, 107 S. Ct. at 1648-52.
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to vote collectively on a proposed change of corporate control. 6
Disinterested shareholders decide whether to accord voting rights to
shares held, or to be acquired, in excess of certain percentages. The
states now have a newly confirmed constitutional right to regulate the
internal affairs of their domestic corporations.
The continuing onslaught of hostile takeover bids, despite Black
Monday and the Stock Market Debacle, has increasingly intensified.
The "biggest single-day burst of takeover activity in recent memory"
occurred on Monday, February 29, 1988 when six transactions7 with
an indicated total value of about $5.4 billion were announced.
Robert Campeau (Federated Department Stores), Carl Icahn and
T. Boone Pickens (Texaco), Coniston Partners (Gillette), Paul Bilzerian (Singer), and other professional "raiders" with a short-term profit
motive and "bust-up" methodology continue actively in the market.
A few like Robert Holmes a Court have lost heavily in the market
and are inactive. Junk bonds are re-emerging, but most believe their
heyday is past.
The focus is shifting away from professional raiders and toward
domestic and foreign acquirers seeking to expand their markets or
-otherwise achieve corporate objectives. Examples include a major
retailer like R.H. Macy & Co. which sought to acquire all of Federated
Department Stores; Black & Decker, a small tool manufacturer, which
sought to expand into plumbing fixtures by acquiring American
Standard prior to being outbid; and Kodak's move into pharmaceuticals by acquiring Sterling Drug.
Varied and intensifying state attempts to protect local businesses,
jobs, revenues, and taxes, which such businesses represent, continue
unabated. Twenty-nine states, now including Delaware, have adopted
one or more forms of takeover laws, many in the past year or less.'
Some states, like Wisconsin, have adopted more than one form. 9
6. Id. at 1646.

7. Wall St. J., Mar. 1, 1988, § 1, at 3, col. 1.
8. The following states had previously enacted takeover statutes: Connecticut,
Georgia, Illinois, Indiana, Kentucky, Maryland, Michigan, Mississippi, New Jersey,
New York, Ohio, Pennsylvania, Virginia and Wisconsin. Since CTS, Arizona,
Delaware, Florida, Hawaii, Louisiana, Maine, Massachusetts, Minnesota, Missouri,
Nevada, North Carolina, Oklahoma, Oregon, Utah and Washington bring to twentynine the total number of states with takeover laws.
9. See, e.g., Arizona (asset freeze and control share statutes), Florida (control
share and fair price statutes), Indiana (asset freeze and control share statutes),
Kentucky (asset freeze and fair price statutes), Louisiana (control share and fair price
statutes), Minnesota (asset freeze and control share statutes), Missouri (asset freeze
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Those takeover statutes which are the more strongly pro-management
have traditionally been enacted in only a few days' time to protect a
specific local company under serious attack, and the past year has
been no exception.10
Delaware, on February 2, 1988, enacted its Takeover Law as
Section 203 of the Delaware General Corporation LaW. 11 That state's
pre-eminence in the state corporate law field, its early rejection of the
control share approach after the CTS opinion, and its long-awaited
solution, highlight the tensions in the field and may impel Congress
or the SEC to act. Three of the five SEC Commissioners oppose
and control share statutes), North Carolina (control share and fair price statutes),
Washington (asset freeze and fair price statutes), and Wisconsin (control share and
fair price statutes).
10. North Carolina was the first state to introduce legislation following the
CTS decision. The legislative action was prompted by Asher Edelman's attempt to
buy Burlington Industries, Inc. Minnesota's takeover statute was enacted when the
governor was petitioned by Dayton-Hudson Corp., under seige by the Dart Group
Corp., to pass protective legislation. A special legislative session was called and a bill
passed the next day. Arizona's control share statute was introduced by Greyhound
Corp., believing itself to be the target of a takeover attempt. The Arizona legislature
approved and the governor signed into law the next day the takeover bill. And Boeing
prompted Washington to pass legislation to protect it from T. Boone Pickens in only
eleven days. See Pamepinto & Heard, New State Regulation of Corporate Takeovers,
Nat. L.J., Sept. 21, 1987, at 26, col. 1. The chart below illustrates states which have
enacted statutes and provisions in response to threatened takeovers of local companies.

State
Arizona
Connecticut
Florida
Hawaii

Kentucky
Maryland
Massachusetts
Minnesota
Missouri

New York
North Carolina
Ohio
Ohio
Oklahoma
Pennsylvania

Washington
Wisconsin

11.

Company

Date

Greyhound Corp.
Aetna Insurance
Harcourt Brace Jovanovich
Int'l Holding Capital Corp.
Ashland Oil
Martin-Marietta Corp.
Gillette Co.
Dayton-Hudson Corp.
TWA
CBS
Burlington Industries
Goodyear Tire
Federated Dept. Stores
Unocal
Scott Paper Co.
Boeing
Heileman Brewing Company

1987
1984
1987
1986
1986
1983
1987
1987
1985
1985
1987
1986
1988
1985
1983
1987
1987

DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 203 (Supp. 1988).

. 332
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Delaware's Takeover Law but have not effectively stopped the "balkanization" of state law enactments.
Congress has many bills pending at this time.12 Hearings and
"mark-up" sessions were conducted last Fall, but Congress has yet
to preempt all takeover laws or any of the more pro-management
varieties.
The questions now are: (1) what form of takeover law or laws
should a state adopt if it has not already done so, (2) are such state
enactments effective and constitutional, (3) will Congress pre-exempt,
(4) what actions can the Securities and Exchange Commission take
and will it do so under new Chairman David Ruder, and (5) if there
is federal pre-emption, is any form of takeover law still available to
the states?
II.

ILLINOIS LEGISLATIVE DEVELOPMENTS

Illinois has not been a principal battleground in the takeover area
since enactment of the Illinois Business Take-Over Act 3 in the late
1970's. That Illinois Act was struck down by the United States
Supreme Court in a landmark opinion in Edgar v. MITE Corp. 14 A
serious attempt was mide in 1985 to enact takeover legislation similar
to the Pennsylvania statute.' 5 Those efforts were pursued by major
Illinois corporations and opposed by the Chicago Bar Association,
among other groups. That legislative battle resulted in the enactment
of the fair price provision, closely modeled after the Maryland prototype,' 6 which is Section 7.85 of the Illinois Business Corporation
Act of 1983.17 Section 8.85 was also added at that time, allowing the
board of directors of an Illinois corporation to consider other con12. See, e.g., S. 227, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. (Jan. 6, 1987), entitled the Tender
Offer Reform Act of 1987; S. 521, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. (Feb. 5, 1987), entitled the
Tender Offer Improvement Act of 1987; S. 678, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. (Mar. 6,
1987), entitled the Corporate Takeover Reform Act of 1987; H.R. 1601, 100th Cong.,
1st Sess. (Mar. 12, 1987), entitled the Tender Offer Reform Act of 1987; H.R. 2172,
100th Cong., 1st Sess. (Apr. 27, 1987), entitled the Tender Offer Reform Act of
1987; S. 1323, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. (June 4, 1987), entitled the Tender Offer
Disclosure and FairnessAct of 1987; S. 1324, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. (June 4, 1987),
entitled the Corporate Takeover and Insider Abuse Reform Act of 1987; H.R. 3618,
100th Cong., 1st Sess. (Nov. 9, 1987), entitled the Shareholders Rights Act of 1987.
13. ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 121 1/2, §§ 137.50 to 137.70 (1981), repealed by Act
No. 83-365, 1983 11. Legis. Serv. 2628 (West).
14. 457 U.S. 624 (1982).
15. PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 1910 (Purdon Supp. 1987).
16. MD. CORPS. & Ass'Ns CODE ANN. §§ 3-601 to 3-603 (1985 & Supp. 1987).
17. ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 32, para. 7.85 (1985).
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stituencies such as shareholders, the community, employees, suppliers,
and the like."8
In April 1987, Senate Bill 803, regulating takeovers in a highly
pro-management format, was introduced in the Illinois Senate.19 The
bill would have required a hearing by the Illinois Secretary of State
and would have applied unconstitutionally to foreign as well as
domestic corporations. Within a few weeks thereafter, the United
States Supreme Court decided the CTS case and Senate Bill 803 was
scheduled to be amended to conform identically to the Indiana Control
Share Acquisition Chapter upheld in that decision. 20 However, the
initial support for the original Senate Bill 803 and the Indiana clone
disappeared when major Illinois corporations decided that the Indiana
control share acquisition format was undesirable. In their opinion,
the control share type statute was a limitation on the flexibility of
management to manage the corporation and shifted effective power
of the corporation to disinterested shareholders.
No legislative action was taken during the session ending June
30, 1987, except to refer takeover legislation to an interim study
committee of the General Assembly headed by Rep. John Dunn.
Hearings were held by that committee in Chicago in September 1987,
and informal fact-finding sessions were conducted by Rep. John
Cullerton, the Democratic Floor Leader, a month thereafter, and
again on March 30, 1988, which resulted in comments of: (a) major
Illinois corporations opposing the control share act approach and
preferring the New York style "freeze-out" legislation; and (b) the
Chicago Bar Association opposing Senate Bill 803 in its original form
and as amended to conform to the Indiana legislation upheld in the
CTS case. The legislative groups also heard proponents of the original
Senate Bill 803 approach, attempting to give extraterritorial effect to
foreign corporations, and learned of developments in Congress, at
the SEC, and the work of the ABA/NASAA Joint Committee on the
Model Act.
There was a general consensus that there should be no legislative
action in Illinois until Spring 1988, or later, when Congressional,
SEC, ABA/NASAA Joint Committee, and Delaware developments,
together with any court cases decided in the interim, should make the
situation clearer. Some form of takeover legislation in Illinois, in
addition to the fair price provision, is likely in the session ending

18. Id. at para. 8.85.
19. S.B. 803, 85th Ill. Gen. Ass., 1st Sess. (Apr. 1987).
20. S.B. 803, 85th Ill. Gen. Ass., 1st Sess. (amended May 1987).

NORTHERN ILLINOIS UNIVERSITY LA W REVIEW

[Vol. 8

June 30, 1988, or soon thereafter, in the light of the dynamic events
and circumstances noted earlier in this article.

III.

TAKEOVER STATUTES

A brief analysis of the significant different forms of state takeover
laws follows. However, each type of law has been analyzed in varying
detail in the other articles comprising this symposium.
A. THE "ASSET-FREEZE" VARIETY

Business combination or "asset-freeze" type legislation is currently in effect in New York, New Jersey, Indiana, Kentucky, and
Missouri. 2' And since CTS, Arizona, Minnesota, Pennsylvania, Washington and Wisconsin, bring to eight the total number of states with
anti-freeze statutes.?
These laws are similar in nature; the principal difference relates
to the three or five-year time period during which a "business
combination" with independent parties or "insiders" is prohibited.
Such statutes are insidious, are clearly designed to entrench management, show management's disdain for the best interests of shareholders, have little or no redeeming benefit, and are very likely
unconstitutional. These laws have led a charmed life to date with only
one federal or state court decisions construing them, despite New
York having adopted its version .more than two years ago during the
CBS-Ted Turner battle.
A Milwaukee federal district court judge, in early May, 1988,
ruled the Wisconsin business combination/" asset freeze" statute unconstitutional as "frustrating the purpose of the Williams Act" and
giving management "a virtual veto over the outcome of a tender offer
contest." The Wisconsin statute barred any business combination for
three years unless the bidder obtained the board's approval for
crossing the 10% threshold. The Court further stated the statute
"enhances the power of a company's board of directors by giving it,
21. See New York, N.Y. Bus. CoRP. LAW § 912 (McKinney 1986); New Jersey,
N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 14A:IOA-1 to 14A:1OA-6 (West Supp. 1987); Indiana, IND. CODE
ANN. § 23-1-43 (West Supp. 1987); Kentucky, Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 271A.397
(Michie/Bobbs-Merrill Supp. 1986); Missouri, Mo. ANN. STAT. § 351.459 (Vernon
Supp. 1988).
22. See Arizona, ARIz. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 10-1221 to 10-1223 (Supp. 1987);
Minnesota, MiNN. STAT. ANN. § 302A.673 (West Supp. 1988); Pennsylvania, PA.
STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 1409.1 and § 1911 (Purdon 1988); Washington, WASH. REV.
CODE ANN. § 23A.08.425 (Supp. 1988); and Wisconsin, Wis. STAT. ANN. § 180.25
(West Supp. 1987).
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without shareholder approval, the statutory right to block a business
combination for three years irrespective of its shareholders' preferences." The Court limited its holding to the Supremacy Clause, did
not need to rule on the challenge under the Commerce Clause and
easily distinguished control share statutes upheld in the CTS case. The
SEC's amicus brief had also challenged the constitutionality of the

Wisconsin Act. 23 A federal district court judge in New Jersey was

ready recently to render his written opinion when Singer and Paul
Bilzerian settled their battle, and Black Monday killed the proposed
hearing on a temporary restraining order by the Haft family's Dart
Group Corp. against the Minnesota "freeze-out" statute in the quest
for Dayton-Hudson Corp.
24
The "freeze-out" type statute is considered the most obnoxious,
rigorous and effective means of thwarting hostile takeovers, by prohibiting a merger or other broadly defined "business combination"
between any independent or interested parties, unless the raider procures advance approval from the board of directors of the target
company. New York and other states have a five-year prohibition on

a subsequent business combination; 25 Wisconsin has a three-year
period. 26 The New York statute and some others then have a "fair
price" provision following the prohibited time periods. 27

23. RTE Corp. v. Mark IV Indus., Inc., Civil Action No. 88-C-378, (E.D.
Wis., May 4, 1988).
24. The "honor" of the "most obnoxious" statutory scheme may now belong
to Pennsylvania, which adopted substantial additions and changes to its statutory
anti-takeover arsenal, effective March 23, 1988. Pennsylvania's statute (1) lowered
the control share threshold (which triggers dissenter's rights) from 300o to 20% and
"grandfathered" shares held for five years, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 1910(b)(l)
(Purdon 1988); (2) strengthened its business combination provisions, PA. STAT. ANN.
tit. 15, § 1409.1 (Purdon 1988); and (3) became the first state to expressly validate
the use of "poison pills" or shareholder rights plans as a defense against a corporate
takeover attempt, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 1611(A)-(C) (Purdon 1988).
25. N.Y. Bus. Cosu. LAW § 912(17) (McKinney 1986). See Appendix 4.
26. WIs. STAT. ANN.

§ 180.25 (West Supp. 1987).

27. N.Y. Bus. Coap. LAW § 912 (McKinney 1986). The "fair price" component
is similar to independent, fair price statutes enacted in several states like §7.85 of the
Illinois Business Corporation Act of 1983 and its prototype from Maryland. MD.
Coats. & Ass'NS. CODE ANN. § 3-603 (1985 & Supp. 1986). Fair price statutes are
designed to protect against coercive, abusive, front-end loaded, two-tier tender offers
and require an acquiror to pay the same consideration (all cash, all junk bonds, or
a combination thereof, etc.) to all shareholders. Such statutes are considered the least
intrusive into the balanced playing field of raider, target, and the other players in
the takeover field.
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THE DELAWARE TAKEOVER LAW

Next down the line from the most rigorous type of takeover
statutes is the Delaware-type statute. 28 Delaware's new Section 203 is
an improvement over the strict business combination-type statute, and
a number of less onerous changes have been made. However, a close
analysis will show that it is still highly pro-management, but much
less insidious '
Section 203 essentially prohibits any Delaware corporation from
engaging in any business combination (broadly defined) with an
"interested stockholder" (but not an independent party) for three
years unless (a) the target company board first approved the business
combination or the transaction in which the acquirer became an
interested stockholder, or (b) the acquirer will own at least 85% of
the target company's stock after the transaction in which the acquirer
became an interested stockholder (excluding shares owned by "inside
directors" or employee stock plans where employees do not have a
confidential voting right), or (c) on or after such date the business
combination is approved by the target company's board and by twothirds of its voting stock not owned by the interested stockholder (at
a stockholder's meeting, not by stockholders consent). 29 A grandfather
clause excepts shares owned prior to December 23, 1987.30
Section 203 does not apply if (a) the Delaware corporation optsout in its original charter; (b) the board amends its by-laws to optout within 90 days of Section 203's effective date; (c) stockholders
amend the charter to opt-out (but with a 12 month delay or if a
business combination is in process); or (d) the corporation does not
have a class of stock listed on a national stock exchange or on
3
NASDAQ or held of record by less than 2,000 stockholders. ' 3 2A
corporation can opt-in if a business combination is not in process.
The Delaware Takeover Law, Section 203, has been held constitutional by two different Federal District Court judges in Delaware
this spring." In BNS Inc. v. Koppers Co., Inc. ,34 Chief Judge Schwartz
found Delaware Section 203 "most likely constitutional" in its regula28. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 203 (Supp. 1988). See Appendix 3.
29. Id. § 203(a).
30. Id. § 203(c)(5).
31. Id. § 203(b).
32. Id. § 203(b)(5).
33. BNS Inc. v. Koppers Co., Inc., Civil Action No. 88-130-MMS (Del. Del.
April 1, 1988); RP Acquisition Corp. v. Staley Continental Inc., Civil Action No. 88190-JRR (D. Del. May 9, 1988).

34. Civil Action No. 88-130-MMS (D. Del. April, 1988).
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tion of post-tender offer business combinations. The Court held that
the plaintiffs had failed to demonstrate probable success on the merits
in its denial of a preliminary injunction based on the alleged unconstitutionality of Section 203. A month later, in RP Acquisition Corp. v.
Staley Continental Inc. , 3 Judge June Roth Held Section 203 contitutional in a 30-page opinion. In upholding Section 203, the Staley
opinion relies heavily on the BNS decision by Judge Schwartz and the
United States Supreme Court opinion in the CTS case. However, the
Staley case was settled as part of a takeover agreement and will not be
appealed. The BNS case is still pending in several federal courts, but
it is not known whether appeal is being taken. One of the important
reasons for its possible constitutionality is the significance of Delaware
nationally as the principal corporation law state. Other reasons, such
as its focus on conflict of interest, are examined at length in other
articles in this symposium. However, the fact that Delaware is the state
of incorporation is its only jurisdictional nexus for constitutional
purposes.
C.

THE CONSTITUTIONAL INDIANA CHAPTER

Next down the line in the takeover playing field is the Indiana
Control Share Acquisition Chapter upheld by the Supreme Court in
the CTS case. The Indiana Chapter is clearly constitutional, but has
been significantly criticized by the American Bar Association/North
American Securities Administrators Association (ABA/NASAA) Joint
Committee on Model Control Share Act, by the Chicago Bar Asso36
ciation Corporation Law Committee ad hoc Takeover Task Force,
and by the Council of the Corporation Law Section of the Delaware
State Bar Association."
The principal criticisms of the Indiana Chapter are set forth in
the Model Act materials attached to this symposium as Appendix 5,
which materials consist of the explanatory cover memorandum and
list of members dated February 8, 1988, the Synopsis of the Model
35. Civil Action No. 88-190-JRR (D. Del. May 9, 1988).
36. The CBA Takeover Task Force was formed immediately after the Supreme
Court decision in the CTS case, and is comprised of several members of the CBA
Corporation Law Committee (including the author) and other interested parties
including the principal combatants in the CTS case, which was litigated in the Chicago
Federal District Court (637 F. Supp. 389 (N.D. I11.1986)), and 7th Circuit Court of
Appeals (805 F.2d 705 (7th Cir. 1986)). Many of the Task Force's suggestions have
been incorporated into the ABA/NASAA Model Control Share Act.

37. Black, Why Delaware Is Wary of Anti-Takeover Law, Wall St. J., July

10, 1987, § 1, at 18, col. 3.
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State Control Share Act and Summary of Principal Differences Between Model Act and Indiana Statute, the Model Act including
Preliminary Statement with Official Comments, and the Survey of
State Control Share Acquisition Statutes.
The Ohio Takeover Act,38 not the Indiana Chapter, was the first
control share act; 16 states now have such legislation. 9 Some are
more rigorous than Indiana's, and in some instances are of questionable validity because of the pro-management changes from Indiana.
In TLX Acquisition Corp. v. Telex Corp.,40 a federal district
court in Oklahoma resolved any open questions as to the Supreme
Court decision in the CTS case when it decided that the Oklahoma
Control Share Acquisition Act, similar to the Indiana Chapter, was
inapplicable to protect Telex, a Delaware corporation. Telex had its
principal office, most of its assets, most of its stockholders, and all
other aspects of its corporate life in the State of Oklahoma, yet it
was incorporated in Delaware. The court, in a TRO hearing, held
that the attempt to apply the Oklahoma Act in an extraterritorial
manner to protect Telex, a Delaware corporation, was invalid and
4
unconstitutional. 1
IV.

THE MODEL CONTROL SHARE ACT

The least intrusive and best balanced of the state takeover laws
or proposals currently under consideration is the proposed Model
State Control Share Act promulgated by ABA/NASAA. The Model
Act provides the most level takeover playing field among acquirer
corporations or individual raiders, target corporations, and the management and shareholders of the target ccmpa.ny. The Model Act
could be considered to be a state Williams Act in the sense of being
38. OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 1701.831 (Page 1985).
39. See Arizona, ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 10-1211 to 10-1217 (Supp. 1987);
Florida, FLA. STAT. ANN. § 607.109 (West Supp. 1988); Hawaii, HAwAn REV. STAT.
§§ 416-171 to 416-172 (1985); Indiana, IND. CODE ANN. § 23-1-42 (West Supp. 1987);
Louisiana, LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 12:135 to 12:140.2 (West Supp. 1987); Maine,
MAjNE REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 13-A, § 910 (Supp. 1987); Massachusetts, MASS. GEN.
LAws ANN. ch. I10C, §§ I to 13 (West Supp. 1988); Minnesota, MIN. STAT. ANN.
§ 302A.671 (West Supp. 1988); Missouri, Mo. ANN. STAT. § 351.407 (Vernon Supp.
1988); Nevada, NEV. REV. STAT. §§ 78.376 to 78.3793 (1985 & Supp. 1987); North
Carolina, N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 5-90 to 55-98 (Supp. 1987); Ohio, OHIo REv. CODE
ANN. § 1701.831 (Page 1985); Oklahoma, OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, §§ 1145 to 1155
(West Supp. 1988); Oregon, 1987 Or. Laws ch. 820, §§ I to 11; Utah, UTAH CODE
ANN. tit. 15, § 1910 (1987).
40. 679 F. Supp. 1022 (W.D. Okla. 1987).
41. Id. at 1033-34.
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the most even-handed of the state takeover offerings, at least until
something better, not yet promulgated, appears on the scene. The
Model Act is not only constitutional, but better balanced than Indiana's Chapter. It affords reasonable protections to all players, and is
practical as well.
Although the Model Act does suffer some shareholder voting
disenfranchisement, 4 2 it is complex, and management does not like it
because management loses flexibility to its disinterested shareholders.
Nevertheless, it is the best available alternative for a number of

reasons, all of which are outlined in the Model Act materials attached

as Appendix 5 to this article, and especially the Synopsis, Preliminary
43
Statement, and Official Comments.
Many prominent members of the American Bar Association have
traditionally opposed state takeover legislation as interfering with
efficient national and international market forces and leading to
"balkanization" of takeover regulation. The North American Securities Administrators Association consists of the state securities law
or Blue Sky Commissioners of the 50 states and traditionally has
favored state takeover statutes. The motive attributed to the state
administrators-rightly or wrongly-has been to protect shareholders
of domestic corporations and local interests.
After the Supreme Court decided the CTS case and after the
criticism of the Indiana Act by the CBA Task Force and the Delaware
42. Failure of a majority of disinterested shareholders at a meeting to accord
voting rights under the prescribed procedures is a permanent disenfranchisement
under the Indiana Act. IND'. CODE ANN. § 23-1-42-9 (West Supp. 1987). The Model
Act provides for annual and other periodic disinterested shareholders' votes to
consider restoring voting rights, section 5(g), and (as an option available to the
individual state) provides for full restoration of voting rights automatically after three
years, section 4(d), if such voting rights were denied initially. However, the acquiring
person under the Model Act is still disenfranchised for some period if disinterested
shareholders deny voting rights in the first instance.
43. Illinois and other states may have state constitutional problems with any
takeover or other corporate law which denies or varies the one vote per share
requirement. The 1870 Illinois Constitution mandated one vote for each share of
corporate stock. Although the 1970 Constitution eliminated that mandate, application
of the Model Act and certain other takeover laws to Illinois business corporations
organized prior to the July 1, 1971 effective date of the relevant section of the
Transition Schedule of the 1970 Constitution may be invalid. See Roanoke Ins.
Agency v. Edgar, 101 Ill. 2d 315, 322, 461 N.E.2d 1365, 1368 (1984). The Illinois
Fair Price Amendment (Business Corporation Act §7.85, effective September 23,
1985) may suffer the same uncertainty and possible invalidity because of its supermajority votes, etc. However, the author believes the dramatically changed public
policy of Illinois on this critical issue, as evidenced by the Business Corporation Act
of 1983, as amended, may well be persuasive in any constitutional test of §7.85.
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bar group," in July 1987, the State Regulation of Securities Committee
of the Business Law Section of the American Bar Association and the
Tender Offer Regulation Committee of the North American Securities
Administrators Association convened an ad hoc Joint Committee on
a Model Control Share Act to review the Indiana Act and to suggest
ways in which it might be improved. The Joint Committee first met
in late August in Colorado and determined that it would initially limit
its work to a review, analysis, and attempt to improve the Indiana
Chapter rather than to deal with the "asset freeze" type legislation
or "greenmail" or "golden parachute" legislation. The committee
met three additional times in New York and Chicago and has produced
a Public Exposure Draft of a Model Control Share Act, Official
Comments, and related materials dated February 8, 1988, which are
attached as Appendix 5. A conference call was conducted among 14
Joint Committee members on March 23, 1988, to consider public
comments.
The Joint Committee published its final Model State Control
Share Act and related materials on March 29, 1988, for consideration
by the various states. The full membership of NASAA approved the
Model Act without recommendation for consideration by the states
at its meeting on April 22, 1988. The ABA position is unclear at this
writing. The Model Act and Official Comments are intended to serve
as a guide for states wishing to enact or amend a control share
acquisition statute. Sixteen states have enacted control share acquisition legislation similar to Indiana's, either before or after the CTS
decision. 45 It clearly has been the most popular format, judged solely
by the number of such statutes currently in effect. Recently the trend
has been to enact business combination/asset-freeze type legislation
as in Washington and Maine. 46 The legislation generally follows the
same format, but there are significant differences. Following the
Model Act and Official Comments in Appendix 5 is a Survey of such
control share acquisition legislation outlining the essential provisions
of each, including the Model Act.
The purpose of the Joint Committee has been to provide a
uniform statute that comes within the constitutional limitations laid
down in the CTS opinion by the Supreme Court and also responds
to the perceived need to modify or clarify certain provisions of the

44. See supra notes 32-33 and accompanying text.
45. See supra note 10.
46. WASHINGTON REV. CODE ANN. § 23A.08.425 (Supp. 1988);
STAT. ANN. tit. 13-A, § 910 (Supp. 1987).
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Indiana Chapter. The Official Comments were prepared and specifically approved by the Joint Committee and describe the substantive
decisions made in the drafting of each provision. They further explain
the meaning and purpose of each. Public comments on the Exposure
Draft have now been received, considered, and appropriate revisions
made. The Model Act is now offered for consideration by the states
without recommendation by any Joint Committee member on the
desirability of this legislation for any particular state.
The Indiana Chapter is clearly constitutional. As a result, the
Joint Committee departed from the Indiana Chapter only for good
reason, but has made many major revisions. The Model Act is
intended to serve not only as a guide for states considering enactment
or amendment of such legislation, but also to withstand constitutional
scrutiny and to be reasonably consistent with the existing framework
of state corporation law and practice.
The Supreme Court recognized in the CTS case that there is some
room for state legislation regulating tender offers which "furthers the
federal policy of investor protection" and is calculated to protect
legitimate state interests.47 The Joint Committee attempted to adhere
to four requirements which emerged from that decision:
1. Such state tender offer regulation must not conflict with the
federal policy implicit in the Williams Act that independent shareholders faced with tender offers often are at a disadvantage in required
protection from the coercive aspects of some tender offers.
2. Such tender offer regulation may allow shareholders to evaluate
the fairness of the offer collectively but should not allow the state
government to interpose its view of fairness between willing buyers
and sellers of shares of the target company.
3. Such tender offer regulation must not give either management
or the offeror an advantage in communicating with the shareholders
about the impending offer.
4. Such regulation may not impose unreasonable delay upon a
tender offer.

V.

THE MODEL ACT APPROACH

The cornerstone of the Model Act and the Indiana statute is the
section providing that if a person acquires shares of a domestic
corporation to which the Act applies in excess of certain thresholds
of voting power-one-fifth (200%o), one-third (33-1/3%) and a majority
47. CTS, 107 S. Ct. at 1646.
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(over 50%) 4 -such shares have no voting power unless restored by a
vote of the holders of a majority of the "non-interested shares" of
the corporation. Although the Model Act's definition of "control
shares" is the same as the Indiana statute, the Model Act uses the
definition somewhat differently by stressing the means of exercising49
control rather than the concept of acquisition of shares in Indiana.
Also, the Model Act does not affect the voting rights of shares
representing up to 200o of all voting power, as well as additional
shares acquired within a range of voting power for which shareholder
approval has already been obtained. 0 Consequently, the number of
shares which may be disenfranchised is reduced. Maximizing the
number of shares afforded the right to vote is generally a tenet of
good corporate practice and a guiding principle of the Joint Committee.
The Model Act does not cover acquisitions by persons who
acquire shares for the benefit of others in the ordinary course of
48.

MODEL STATE CONTROL SrARE ACT

(Pub. Discussion Draft #1, Mar. 29,

1988) 3(d) [hereinafter MSCSA]. The ABA/NASAA Joint Committee agreed with
the reason for the triple threshold, according to the drafting commentary to the
Indiana statute, that:
(i) 20% is the level of ownership at which, under equity accounting rules, a
corporation may report the results of its investment in another corporation
as a line item on its financial statements; (ii) 33% is generally recognized as
a sufficient block of shares to constitute effective control for most, if not
all, practical purposes where a public corporation's shareholders are generally dispersed; and (iii) a majority or more of voting power comprises literal
control.
Id. at commentary to § 3(d).
49. Id. § 3(d).
As used in the Model Act, "control shares" are all shares owned of record
or beneficially by the acquiring person (including shares acquired in separate
purchases over an extended period of time) that, when added to all other
holdings of the acquiring person, entitle the acquiring person to exercise
voting power in excess of one or more of the three specified thresholds of
voting power. . . .Thus, while the Indiana statute and most of the other
state control share laws emphasize the concept of the acquisition, the Model
Act's focus is on the control shares themselves-the means of exercising
control. The other statutes attempt to identify the transaction constituting
the control share acquisition, and then sterilize shares involved in that
transaction. For purposes of the Model Act, however, it doesn't matter
which shares were involved in the control share acquisition transaction (so
long as such a transaction occurred) and which shares were previously held.
The consequence with respect to the voting rights of both kinds of shares is
the same.
Id. at commentary to § 3(d).
50. Id. §§ 3(I), 4(b) and 4(c).
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business (e.g., brokers and nominees), so long as such acquisition is
made in good faith and not for the purpose of circumventing the
Act. 5 In addition, the Act excludes from the definition of "control
share acquisition" the acquisition of shares in any of eleven stated
circumstances, some of the more important of which are:
1. Acquisition at a time when the corporation was not
subject to the Act;
2.

Acquisition by inheritance;

*3. Acquisition by inter vivos gift;
*4. Acquisition by transfer among family members or persons under direct common control;
5. Acquisition by a pledge or other security interest;
6.

Acquisition from another person where the Act would
otherwise be invoked, provided that the person acquiring
such shares does not thereby increase his or her voting
power to a next higher threshold, and so long as there is
only one such transfer;

*7. Acquisition of additional shares within the range of
voting power for which approval has already been granted,
or where the range was achieved through an excluded
transaction;
*8.

Where the corporation itself causes an increase in the
person's voting power; and
2
*9. Pursuant to the solicitation of proxies.1
The shareholder vote approval procedure under Section 5 of the
Model Act is comparable to the approval procedure in the Indiana
statute. To obtain approval, the acquiring person must deliver a
disclosure statement that, among other things, identifies the person,
states the number of shares directly or indirectly owned and the dates
and prices at which such shares were acquired, and represents that
An asterisk indicates a Model Act exclusion not found in the Indiana
Act.
*

51. Id. § 3(e)(2).
52. Id. § 3(e)(3).
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the acquisition was lawful and that the person has the financial

capacity to make it." A special meeting of shareholders must then be
called within 10 days after delivery of the disclosure statement and
must be held not less than 30 days, nor more than 50 days, after
receipt of the request for the meeting. These time periods are meant
to coordinate with the 60-day period after which tendering sharehold-

ers must be granted withdrawal rights under the federal takeover

regulatory scheme in the Williams Act.5 4 In determining which share-

holders may vote on whether to accord voting rights to control shares,
interested persons, such as the acquiring person, officers, and employee-directors of the corporation, are excluded."
53. Id. at commentary to § 5(a).
Unlike the comparable Indiana provision, in order to set the shareholder
voting procedures in motion, this is made a mandatory procedure on the
part of any acquiring person who has made a control share acquisition, and
is optional on the part of a person who proposes to make a control share
acquisition. Of course, an acquiring person who has acquired no shares but
proposes to do so, and who does not publish and deliver a disclosure
statement, does not invoke the shareholder voting procedures. The publication requirement (which is not found in the Indiana law) is designed to
prevent an acquiring person who proposes to make, but who has not yet
made, a control share acquisition from initiating the shareholder voting
procedure without cost or serious consequence to the acquiring person. Such
action might otherwise be employed simply to put the company "in play"
without any real intent to follow through with the control share acquisition ....

But, unlike the Indiana statute, failure to file a disclosure statement

does not establish a redemption right on the part of the corporation. More
generally, failures of compliance with the procedures established in this
section of the Act can be remedied like any other breach of statutory
corporate law-by resort to the courts.
Id. at commentary to § 5(a) (emphasis added).
54. Id. § 5(b).
55. Id. § 3(f).
The Joint Committee considered suggestions to expand the definition to
include holders of 10076 or more of the stock and outside directors, but was
not persuaded of the need to disenfranchise either of these categories.
The major premise underlying the "interested share" concept is that the
right to approve the exercise of control of an issuing public corporation
should rest with owners of the corporation whose interest in the decision is
solely as a pre-transaction shareholder. As is pointed out in the Indiana
commentary, the acquiring person's interest in the control share vote is
obvious, and the interest of officers and "inside" directors is in preserving
corporate positions which might be threatened by an acquisition. Thus, the
shares held by these persons are "interested shares." The U. S. Supreme
Court's decision in the CTS case specifically held that the Indiana statute's
definition of "interested shares" was consistent with the statute's shareholder protection purposes in that it disqualified both the acquiror and
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The Model Act includes the following provisions regarding the

shareholder vote approval procedure which are not present in the
Indiana statute: (a) a requirement that an acquiring person must
publish in the newspaper, as well as deliver to the corporation, the
disclosure statement; and (b) any proxy must be solicited separately
from any offer to purchase shares of the corporation.5 6
VI.

THE MODEL ACT IMPROVEMENTS

Some of the other important differences between the Model Act
and the Indiana Chapter include:
A.

RESTORATION OF VOTING RIGHTS

Section 5(g) deals directly with shareholder voting disenfranchisement (erroneously stated as 5(c) on page 3 of the Synopsis) by
inside management of the target corporation from voting on whether to
grant voting rights to the acquiror's control shares. Moreover, this is one
of the ways the Model Act "protects the independent shareholder against
both of the contending parties ... further[ing] a basic purpose of the
Williams Act, 'plac[ing] investors on an equal footing with the takeover
bidder'."
Id. at commentary to § 5(f) quoting CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of America, 107
S. Ct. 1637, 1645 (1987) (citations omitted).
The Model Act's definition deals with two additional items: It clarifies the point
in time at which the determination is made as to whether shares are "interested
shares"-the record date. Most state statutes may be read as implying that this
determination is made as of the meeting-date. Also, the definition excludes from the
category of "interested shares" those voted solely under the authority of a revocable
proxy. This proviso appears necessary to permit management and the acquiring
person to solicit proxies in connection with the meeting without thereby sterilizing
those shares for the critical vote.
56. MSCSA, supra note 15, § 5(f).
One criticism of the Indiana statute and other state control share acquisition
laws involves the strategy of soliciting revocable proxies along with a tender
of the shares in the tender offer. The acquiring person's acquisition of
proxies from shareholders of record who tender has the effect of undermining the basic premise of the statute-that is, facilitating a collective decision
by the pre-transaction shareholders on a change of control. Subsection 3(f)
excludes from the definition of "interested shares" shares in respect of
which voting power may be exercised or directed solely by the authority of
a revocable proxy. This is to avoid the unintended consequence of requiring
all shareholders to attend in person the meeting of shareholders, in order to
prevent disenfranchisement of their shares by giving their proxy to an officer
or director of the issuing public corporation. If proxies are to be solicited
for purposes of the approval vote, therefore, both the acquiring person and
the issuing public corporation will be on equal footing in having to make a
separate solicitation.
Id. at commentary to § 5(f).
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requiring annual reconsideration by shareholders and permits other
reconsideration by shareholders of restoring voting rights if previously
denied."
Section 4(d) also provides for automatic restoration of voting
rights after three years. This is an optional provision available to a
state in its deliberations. The bracketed language in the text of
subsection 4(d) of the Model Act and the Commentary reflect the
Joint Committee's inability to reach a clear consensus on whether
voting rights of control shares should be restored after some period
of time, even where the vote of disinterested shareholders to do so
has failed to gain approval. Those who favor automatic restoration
after three years point to the hardship and fundamental unfairness of
perpetual sterilization of the shares, noting that three years is long
enough to eliminate the coercion and abuses that can accompany
partial tenders and other fractional acquisitions of control. Those
who do not favor the provision argue that restoration of voting rights
after three years without approval of disinterested shareholders is
inconsistent with the statute's fundamental purpose, and would discourage other offers during the three-year waiting period. The perpetual disenfranchisement was one of the most severely criticized parts
of the Indiana statute, especially by the Chicago Bar Association Task
Force.
B.

"OPTING-OUT" AND "OPTING IN"'

Opting out of coverage by a 1934 Act company58 or opting-in
(for a non-'34 Act company meeting specified criteria or a company
which previously opted-out) 9 requires approval of a charter amendment by shareholders. Such approval prevents the possible abuse in
many statutes, including Delaware and Indiana, which allow such acts
only by the Board simply by approving a by-law amendment.
Coverage under the Model Act is invoked automatically with
respect to those domestic corporations that meet the definitional
57. Id. at commentary to § 5(f).
The last sentence of the subsection [requiring annual reconsideration] was

added to mitigate the punitive effects of a negative vote. This provision,

unique to the Model Act, not only permits the voting resolution to come
before the shareholders again, it requires annual consideration. The Joint
Committee feels this procedure accommodates changed circumstances and
provides fairness to the acquiring person.

Id. § 5(f). See also supra note 12.

58. MSCSA, supra note 15, §§ 2(a), 4.
59. Id. § 2(b).
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criteria of "issuing public corporation" set forth in subsection 3(g).
The voting power of a corporation's shares becomes subject to the
Act 12 months after the effective date of the Act, unless the corporation takes the prescribed action to avoid coverage. The 12-month
delay is designed to provide sufficient time for those corporations
that wish to reject the statute's automatic coverage and take the "optout" opportunity presented in Section 4, without having to call a
special shareholders meeting.
Section 2(b) provides a procedure for domestic corporations to
invoke the Act's coverage by an amendment to their articles of
incorporation. These corporations may not be automatically covered
by the Model Act because they do not have all the elements of an
"issuing public corporation." Such "opt-in" provisions may be utilized both by an issuing public corporation that wishes coverage to
begin immediately (prior to the expiration of the 12-month delay
period), and by a corporation that previously opted out. Only about
six of the existing state control share statutes provide an opt-in
procedure. 60
C.

COMPETING BID PROCEDURES

A competing bid procedure is added to make the Model Act
more practical. The procedure under Section 5(h) invokes the shareholder voting procedure of an issuing public corporation before the
voting rights of control shares that are the subject of a prior control
60. Id. § 2(b).
This subsection also establishes eligibility criteria for a corporation that does
not automatically qualify as an issuing public corporation. To elect coverage
under the Act, a domestic corporation must have at least 100 shareholders
of record and satisfy at least one of the three requirements listed in
subparagraph 3(g)(1)B. That subparagraph-part of the definition of "issuing public corporation" -sets forth alternative criteria relating to the
number (10,000) or percentage (10%) of resident shareholders, or the
percentage (10%) of shares held by residents of the state.
The procedure to opt into the Act is that prescribed under the state business
corporation law for amending a corporation's articles of incorporationtypically a board of directors resolution followed by a shareholder voteand parallels the procedure to opt-out of the Act's application. The Joint
Committee chose this approach, as opposed to an amendment to the
corporation's bylaws (which can be accomplished by board action without
shareholder involvement, and which some state control share statutes permit), because the Committee believes this opt-in procedure is an important
corporate action that should require approval by a majority vote of shareholders.
Id. at commentary to § 2(b).
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share acquisition have been restored. It was borrowed from Wisconsin's initial version of a control share acquisition statute (since revised)
and is not found in the laws of any other state.
Under this provision, once a competing control share acquisition
is interjected, shareholders will be given the right to vote on resolutions
relating to both of them, and only the last one approved by shareholders is effective, on the assumption that such approval constitutes
an implicit rejection of the resolution relating to the previous competing control share acquisition. If a resolution relating to a pending
control share acquisition has already received the requisite shareholder
vote, however, the later delivery of a disclosure statement with respect
to a competing control share acquisition has no effect on the prior
control shares (which now have been granted full voting rights).
Where two or more unconsummated control share acquisitions are
pending, the shares of an acquiring person are not "interested shares,"
except with respect to the vote to restore that acquiring person's
voting rights. They are sterilized, however, at a 20 percent or greater
level.
D. CONTROL

61
"Control" not "acquisition" of shares is the critical focal point.

E.

DISENFRANCHISEMENT

Disenfranchisement is reduced to the minimum. For example, a
shareholder going from 1307o to 210%0 only loses the 107o over the first
200o threshold. The Joint Committee chose a different approach to
sterilization of control shares from that found in the Indiana statute
and most other state control share laws. Rather than reducing to zero
the voting rights of the shares acquired in a transaction (or series of
transactions within 90 days) that carries the acquiring person over the
control share threshold, which would leave the earlier acquired shares
with full voting rights, this subsection provides that the voting power
of all shares up to 20 percent is not affected by this article. The Joint
Committee believes that there is very little utility in trying to identify
the transaction that takes an acquiring person. over62 the threshold and
to sterilize the shares involved in that transaction.
F.

REDEMPTION AND DISSENTER RIGHTS

Redemption and dissenter's rights provision have been eliminated.
The Model Act does not provide for the redemption of control shares
61. See supra notes 16-17 and accompanying text.
62. MSCSA, supra note 15, §§ 4(b), 4(c) and 3(e)(3)(I).
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by the issuing public corporation. The Indiana law permits such
mandatory redemption, if authorized in the corporation's articles of
incorporation or bylaws before the occurrence of the control share
acquisition, within 60 days after the last acquisition of any control
shares by the acquiring person if no disclosure statement has been
delivered to the corporation. The Model Act, unlike the Indiana
Chapter, makes the delivery of a disclosure statement mandatory
where a control share acquisition has occurred. Thus, the Joint
Committee determined that this provision is not necessary within the
framework of the Model Act to influence an acquiring person to
deliver a disclosure statement and, in fact, is meaningless in that

context .63
G.

ECONOMIC NEXUS

The economic nexus (principal place of business, substantial
assets and number of employees) has been eliminated to reduce those
factors which smack of local business protectionism, an objective the
Joint Committee sought to avoid. 64
H.

VOTING

Only one vote of disinterested shareholders is required. 65 Indiana
and other states require a second vote by all shareholders including
interested shares, which can significantly entrench management. The
Joint Committee considered and rejected the inclusion of the second
shareholder vote requirement provided for in the Indiana Act, consisting of a majority of all voting power-that is, all shares authorized
to vote in the election of directors by whomever owned. The Committee concluded that such a requirement would give undue weight to
management votes and effectively require the acquiring person to
purchase the control shares, rather than use a conditional tender
offer. Thus, the Joint Committee believes it appropriate to determine,
63. Furthermore, the Indiana statute, along with those of 11 other states,
permits mandatory redemption by the issuing public corporation, if authorized in the
corporation's articles of incorporation or bylaws before the occurrence of the control
share acquisition, of control shares which are not accorded full voting rights by the
shareholders. The Joint Committee again rejected this procedure, in that a mandatory
redemption provision of this kind may be regarded a providing a statutory basis for
"greenmail" or "redemption premium" payments from the corporation to the
acquirer which could be ethically undesirable, financially burdensome to the corporation and discriminatory to the shareholders.
64. MSCSA, supra note 15, § 3(g) and commentary.
65. Id. § 5(g).
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by the single vote provided for in subsection 5(g), the sentiments of
shareholders of the issuing public corporation who are "disinterested"
in the transaction, in the sense that neither the voting rights of their
shares nor their position with the company will be affected by the
vote.
I.

DEFENSIVE TACTICS

New Section 6 of the Model Act protects the disinterested shareholders from abusive tactics of management of the issuing public
corporation in the event of a management leveraged buy-out and the
like. It was prompted by the Joint Committee's concern that those
who control an issuing public corporation can deny disinterested
shareholders the protections afforded by this Act and circumvent the
requirement for a vote of disinterested shares by bringing about a
shareholders' vote to opt-out of the Act as the first step of a control
share acquisition.
Without such a provision in the Act, management would have
the power, -given its influential role in the corporate voting process,
to accomplish through an amendment to the articles of incorporation
that which it could not accomplish through a vote of the disinterested
shareholders. Particularly where management already holds substantial voting power, the amendment to the articles opting out could be
effected over the opposition of a majority of the disinterested shares.
This result not only would frustrate the central purpose of the Act,
it might also be viewed as giving management an unfair advantage
over other potential acquirers.6
J.

DEFINITIONS

The Model Act incorporates several new definitions for acquiring
person, affiliate, and all voting power, 67 and makes significant changes
66. Id. § 6.
To address this problem, Section 6 requires that if an affiliate of the
corporation-one who controls the management and policies, such as officers and directors-alone or with others, acquires a majority or more of the
voting shares within one year of a vote to opt out of the Act, the acquiring
person must offer to purchase all the remaining shares at a price no lower
than the highest price paid for the acquired shares by the acquiring person
during the past year. The Joint Committee believes this approach safeguards
the rights of disinterested shareholders without depriving the corporation of
the flexibility to opt out of the Act for what might be legitimate reasons.
Id. at commentary to § 6.
67. Id. §§ 3(a), 3(b) and 3(c).
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or clarifying provisions with respect to the definitions of control
shares, control share acquisition, interested shares and issuing public
corporation.6
K.

GENERAL

Many additional changes are outlined in the Synopsis and Sum69
mary and Official Comments.
VII.

CONCLUSION

If the new Delaware Takeover Law is held constitutional in a
definitive fashion by an important federal or state court, 70 it may
become the national standard much like Delaware's Director Indemnification Statute has become since its enactment two years ago. 7'
Whether or not the BNS and Staley cases constitute such "definitive"
opinions is still unclear. If Delaware Section 203 is held constitutional,
the New York-style business combination takeover law may more likely
be held constitutional. In that case, other states may choose to enact
either New York or Delaware-type statutes.
If the New York statute is found unconstitutional, 72 a high
likelihood, while waiting for a definitive court decision on the Delaware version, New York and other states with business combination
laws may amend their statutes to adopt the Delaware approach.
Also, if the Delaware takeover statute is held constitutional by a
definitive court decision, Congress may be impelled to act promptly
to preempt not only the Delaware-style statute but the business
combination version as well.
If Congtess were to so preempt (not at all a certainty), there may
still be an opportunity for a state to enhance its protection beyond
such preemption. Congress at least should permit the constitutional
control share type state legislation to continue. The Model Control
Share Act or the Indiana version may be that approach. Such a dual
system of federal and state takeover regulation is contemplated by
the CTS opinion and would be similar to the existing dual regulation
evidenced by federal and state securities laws.
68. Id. §§ 3(d), 3(e), 3(f) and 3(g).

69. See infra Appendix 5 at pp. 385-425.
70. See supra notes 28-35 and accompanying text.
71. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 102(b)(7) (1986).

72. See RTE Corp. v. Mark IV Indus., Inc., Civil Action No. 88-C-378 (E.D.
Wis. May 4, 1988) (federal district court decision holding the comparable Wisconsin
statute unconstitutional). See also supra note 23 and accompanying text.
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If the Delaware takeover statute should be held unconstitutional,
New York and other business combination statutes, ipso facto, should
be invalid as well. If that turns out to be the case, several possibilities
exist: (1) additional states may adopt the Model Control Share Act
or Indiana alternative, (2) Congress may or may not preempt (but
Indiana or the Model Act presumably would still be available and
possibly be "the only game in town"), or (3) a new form of statute
not currently under consideration may be promulgated, considered
and possibly adopted by several states.
It could be argued by those disfavoring the Model Act that there
may be only a modest incentive for any state to adopt the Model Act
in contrast to the Indiana act upheld as constitutional in the CTS
case. There may ultimately be a good faith compromise reached in a
manner similar to the Illinois compromise in 1985 which gave rise to
7
enactment of the Fair Price Amendment. Domestic corporations
probably will strive for the greater protection and flexibility of the
Indiana Chapter if Delaware or the business combination type statute
is not available, by reason of the fact that Indiana clearly is constitutional and likely more attractive to legislators acting at the behest
of domestic corporations seeking to protect local jobs, taxes, revenues,
etc.
The Model Control Share Act should be advocated as a fairer
compromise than Indiana, or any other takeover law, and in the
better, long-term interest of all target companies, managements, shareholders, and the local communities in which such target companies
operate, as well as acquirers with legitimate interests.

73. ILL. REV.

STAT.

ch. 32, para. 7.85 (1985).

Appendix 1
PROPOSED ILLINOIS LEGISLATION

SENATE BILL

803

"Section 1. Article I lA is added to the "Business Corporation
Act of 1983", approved January 5, 1984, as amended, the added
Article to read as follows:
ARTICLE llA. CONTROL SHARE ACQUISITIONS
(Ch. 32, new par. I lA.01)
Sec. I IA.01. "Control shares". As used in this Article, "control
shares" means shares that, except for this Article, would have voting
power with respect to shares of an issuing public corporation that,
when added to all other shares of the issuing public corporation
owned by a person or in respect to which that person may exercise or
direct the exercise of voting power, would entitle that person, immediately after acquisition of the shares (directly or indirectly, along or
as a part of a group), to exercise or direct the exercise of the voting
power of the issuing public corporation in the election of directors
within any of the following ranges of voting power:
(1) one-fifth or more but less than 1/3 of all voting power;
(2) one-third or more but less than a majority of all voting
power; and
(3) a majority or more of all voting power.
(Ch. 32, new par. lIA.02)
Sec. I IA.02. "Control share acquisitions. (a) As used in this
Article, "control share acquisition" means the acquisition (directly or
indirectly) by any person of ownership of, or the power to direct the
exercise of voting power with respect to, issued and outstanding
control shares.
(b) For purposes of this Section, shares acquired within 90 days
or shares acquired pursuant to a plan to make a control share
acquisition are considered to have been acquired in the same acquisition.
(c) For purposes of this Section, a person who acquires shares
in the ordinary course of business for the benefit of others in good
faith and not for the purpose of circumventing this Article has voting
power only of shares in respect of which that person would be able
to exercise or direct the exercise of votes without further instruction
from others.
(d) The acquisition of any shares of an issuing public corporation does not constitute a control share acquisition if the acquisition
is consummated in any of the following circumstances:
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(1) prior to the effective date of this amendatory Act of 1987;
(2) pursuant to a contract existing prior to the effective date of
this amendatory Act of 1987;
(3) pursuant to the laws of descent and distribution;
(4) pursuant to the satisfaction of a pledge or other security
.interest created in good faith and not for the purpose of circumventing
this Article; and
(5) pursuant to a merger or plan of share exchange effected in
compliance with article 11 of this Act if the issuing public corporation
is a party to the agreement of merger or plan of share exchange.
(e) The acquisition of shares of an issuing public corporation
in good faith and not for the purpose of circumventing this Article
by or from:
(1) any person whose voting rights had previously been authorized by shareholders in compliance with this Article; or
(2) any person whose previous acquisition of shares of an issuing
public corporation would have constituted a control share acquisition,
but for subsection (d); does not constitute a control share acquisition,
unless the acquisition entitles any person (directly or indirectly, alone
or as a part of a group) to exercise or direct the exercise of voting
power of the corporation in the election of directors in excess of the
range of the voting power otherwise authorized.
(Ch. 32, new para. 11A.03)
Sec. 11A.03. "Interested shares". As used in this Article, "interested shares" means the shares of an issuing public corporation in
respect of which any of the following persons may exercise or direct
the exercise of the voting power of the corporation in the election of
the directors:
(1) any acquiring person or member of a group with respect to
a control share acquisition;
(2) any officer of the issuing public corporation; or
(3) any employee of the issuing public corporation who is also
a director of the corporation.
(Ch. 32, new par. 11A.04)
Sec. 11A.04. "Issuing public corporation". (a) As used in this
Article, "issuing public corporation" means a corporation, as defined
in subsection (a) of Section 1.80 of this Act, that has:
(1) one hundred or more shareholders;
(2) its principal place of business, its principal office, or substantial assets within Illinois; and
(3) either:
(A) more than 10%70 of its shareholders resident in Illinois;
(B) more than 10% of its shares owned by Illinois residents; or
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(C) ten thousand shareholders resident in Illinois.
(b) The residence of a shareholder is presumed to be the address
appearing in the records of the corporation.
(c) Shares held by banks (except as trustee or guardian), brokers
or nominees shall be disregarded for purposes of calculating the
percentages or numbers described in this Section.
(Ch. 32, new par. I1A.05)
Sec. I1A.05. "Application". Unless the corporation's articles of
incorporation or bylaws provide that this Article does not apply to
control share acquisitions of shares of the corporation before the
control share acquisition, control shares of an issuing public corporation acquired in a control shares acquisition have only such voting
rights as are conferred by Section 11A.09 of this Article.
(Ch. 32, new par. 11A.06)
Sec. 11A.06. Acquiring person statement. Any person who proposes to make or has made a control share acquisition may at the
person's election deliver an acquiring person statement to the issuing
public corporation at the issuing public corporation's principal office.
The acquiring person statement must set forth all of the following:
(1) The identity of the acquiring person and each other member
of any group of which the person is a part for purposes of determining
control shares.
(2) A statement that the acquiring person statement is given
pursuant to this Article.
(3) The number of shares of the issuing public corporation
owned (directly or indirectly) by the acquiring person and each other
member of the group.
(4) The range of voting power under which the control share
acquisition falls or would, if consummated, fall.
(5) If the control share acquisition has not taken place:
(A) a description in reasonable detail of the terms of the proposed control share acquisition; and
(B) representations of the acquiring person, together with a
statement in reasonable detail of the facts upon which they are based,
that the proposed control share acquisition, if consummated, will not
be contrary to law, and that the acquiring person has the financial
capacity to make the proposed control share acquisition.
(Ch. 32, new par. 11A.07)
Sec. 1 1A.07. Special meeting of shareholders. (a) If the acquiring
person so requests at the time of delivery of an acquiring person
statement and gives an undertaking to pay the corporation's expenses
of a special meeting, within 10 days thereafter, the directors of the
issuing public corporation shall call a special meeting of shareholders
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of the issuing public corporation for the purpose of considering the
voting rights to be accorded the shares acquired or to be acquired in
the control share acquisition.
(b) Unless the acquiring person agrees in writing to another
date, the special meeting of shareholders shall be held within 50 days
after receipt by the issuing public corporation of the request.
(c) If no request is made, the voting rights to be accorded the
shares acquired in the control share acquisition shall be presented to
the next special or annual meeting of shareholders.
(d) If the acquiring person so requests in writing at the time of
delivery of the acquiring person statement, the special meeting must
not be held sooner than 30 days after receipt by the issuing public
corporation of the acquiring person statement.
(Ch. 32, new par. IlA.08)
Sec. 11A.08. Notice. (a) If a special meeting is requested, notice
of the special meeting of shareholders shall be given as promptly as
reasonably practicable by the issuing public corporation to all shareholders of record as of the record date set for the meeting, whether
or not entitled to vote at the meeting.
(b) Notice of the special or annual shareholder meeting at which
the voting rights are to be considered must include or be accompanied
by both of the following:
(1) a copy of the acquiring person statement delivered to the
issuing public corporation pursuant to this Article; and
(2) a statement by the board of directors of the corporation,
authorized by its directors, of its position or recommendation, or that
it is taking no position or making no recommendation, with respect
to the proposed control share acquisition.
(Ch. 32, new par. 11A.09)
Sec. I lA.09. Voting rights. (a) Control shares acquired in a
control share acquisition have the same voting rights as were accorded
the shares before the control share acquisition only to the extent
granted by resolution approved by the shareholders of the issuing
public corporation.
(b) To be approved under this Section, the resolution must be
approved by:
(1) each voting group entitled to vote separately on the proposal
by a majority of all the votes entitled to be case by that voting group,
with the holders of the outstanding shares of a class being entitled to
vote as a separate voting group if the proposed control share acquisition would, if fully carried out, result in any of the changes described
in Section 10.25 of this Act, and
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(2) each voting group entitled to vote separately on the proposal
by a majority of all the votes entitled to be case by that group,
excluding all interested shares.
(Ch. 32, new par. 11A. 10)
Sec. I1A.10. Redemption. (a) If authorized in a corporation's
articles of incorporation or bylaws before a control share acquisition
has occurred, control shares acquired in a control share acquisition
with respect to which no acquiring person statement has been filed
with the issuing public corporation may, at any time during the period
ending 60 days after the last acquisition of control shares by the
acquiring person, be subject to redemption by the co poration at the
fair value thereof pursuant to the procedures adopted by the corporation.
(b) Control shares acquired in a control share acquisition are
not subject to redemption after an acquiring person statement has
been filed unless the shares are not accorded full voting rights by the
shareholders as provided in Section 11A.09 of this Article.
(Ch. 32, new par. I1A.11)
Sec. aaA. 11. Dissenters' rights. (a) Unless otherwise provided in
a corporation's articles of incorporation or bylaws before a control
share acquisition has occurred, in the event control shares acquired
in a control share acquisition are accorded full voting rights and the
acquiring person has acquired control shares with a majority or more
of all voting power, all shareholders of the issuing public corporation
have dissenters; rights as provided in this Article.
(b) As soon as practicable after such events have occurred, the
board of directors shall cause a notice to be sent to all shareholders
of the corporation advising them of the facts and that they have
dissenters' rights to receive the fair value of their shares pursuant to
Section 11.65 of this Act.
(c) As used in this Section, "fair value" means a value not less
than the highest price paid per share by the acquiring person in the
control share acquisition.
Section 2. This Act takes effect upon becoming a law.".

Appendix 2
INDIANA CONTROL SHARE ACQUISITION ACT

CHAPTER 42. CONTROL SHARE ACQUISITIONS

Section
23-1-42-1
23-1-42-2
23-1-42-3
23-1-42-4
23-1-42-5
23-1-42-6
23-1-42-7
23-1-42-8
23-1-42-9
23-1-42-10
23-1-42-11

"Control shares" defined
"Control share acquisition" defined
"Interested shares" defined
"Issuing public corporation" defined
Voting right sunder IC 23-1-42-9
Acquiring person statement
Special meeting of shareholders
Notice
Voting rights of acquired control shares; resolution
Redemption of acquired control shares
Dissenters' rights; "fair value" defined

23-1-42-1 "CONTROL SHARES" DEFINED
Sec. 1. As used in this chapter, "control shares" means shares
that, except for this chapter, would have voting power with respect
to shares of an issuing public corporation that, when added to all
other shares of the issuing pubic corporation owned by a person or
in respect to which that person may exercise or direct the exercise of
voting power, would entitle that person, immediately after acquisition
of the shares (directly or indirectly, alone or as a part of a group), to
exercise or direct the exercise of the voting power of the issuing pubic
corporation in the election of directors within any of the following
ranges of voting power:
(1)

One-fifth (1/5) or more but less than one-third (1/3) of
all voting power.

(2)

One-third (1/3) or more but less than a majority of all
voting power.

(3) A majority or more of all voting power.

23-1-42-2 "CONTROL SHARE ACQUISITION" DEFINED
Sec. 2. (a) As use din this chapter, "control share acquisition"
means the acquisition (directly or indirectly) by any person of ownership of, or the power to direct the exercise of voting power with
respect to, issued and outstanding control shares.
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(b) For purposes of this section, shares acquired within ninety
(90) days or shares acquired pursuant to a plan to make a control
share acquisition are considered to have been acquired in the same
acquisition.
(c) For purposes of this section, a person who acquires shares
in the ordinary course of business for the benefit of others in good
faith and not for the purpose of circumventing this chapter has voting
power only of shares in respect of which that person would be able
to exercise or direct the exercise of votes without further instruction
from others.
(d) The acquisition of any shares of an issuing public corporation does not constitute a control share acquisition if the acquisition
is consummated in any of the following circumstances:
(1)

Before January 8, 1986.

(2)

Pursuant to a contract existing before January 8, 1986.

(3) Pursuant to the laws of descent and distribution.
(4) Pursuant to the satisfaction of a pledge or other security
interest created in good faith and not for the purpose of
circumventing this chapter.
(5) Pursuant to a merger or plan of share exchange effected
in compliance with IC 23-1-40 if the issuing public corporation
is a party to the agreement of merger or plan of share
exchange.
(e) The acquisition of shares of an issuing public corporation
in good faith and not for the purpose of circumventing this chapter
by or from:
(1) any person whose voting rights had previously been authorized by shareholders in compliance with this chapter; or
(2) any person whose previous acquisition of shares of an
issuing pubic corporation would have constituted a control
share acquisition but for subsection (d);
does not constitute a control share acquisition, unless the acquisition
entitles any person (directly or indirectly, alone or as a part of a
group) to exercise or direct the exercise of voting power of the
corporation in the election of directors in excess of the range of the
voting power otherwise authorized. As added by P.L. 14901986,
SEC.26.
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23-1-42-3 "INTERESTED SHARES" DEFINED
Sec. 3. As used in this chapter, "interested shares" means the
shares of an issuing public corporation in respect of which any of the
following persons may exercise or direct the exercise of the voting
power of the corporation in the election of directors:
(1) An acquiring person or member of a group with respect
to a control share acquisition.
(2)

Any officer of the issuing public corporation.

(3) Any employee of the issuing public corporation who is
also a director of the corporation.
As added by P.L. 149-1986, SEC.26.
23-1-42-4

"ISSUING PUBLIC CORPORATION"

DEFINED

Sec. 4. (a) As used in this chapter, "issuing public corporation"
means a corporation that has:
(1) one hundred (100) or more shareholders;
(2) its principal place of business, its principal office, or
substantial assets within Indiana; and
(3)

either:

(A) more than ten percent (10%) of its shareholders
resident in Indiana;
(B) more than ten percent (10%) of its shares owned by
Indiana residents; or
(C) ten thousand (10,000) shareholders resident in Indiana.
(b) The residence of a shareholder is presumed to be the address
appearing in the records of the corporation.
(c) Shares held by banks (except as trustee or guardian), brokers
or nominees shall be disregarded for purposes of calculating the
percentages or numbers described in this section. As added by P.L. 1491986, SEC.26.

23-1-42-5

VOTING RIGHTS UNDER

IC 23-1-42-9
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Sec. 5. Unless the corporation's articles of incorporation or
bylaws provide that this chapter does not apply to control share
acquisitions of shares of the corporation before the control share
acquisition, control shares of an issuing public corporation acquired
in a control share acquisition have only such voting rights as are
conferred by section 9 of this chapter. As added by P.L.149-1986,
SEC.26.
23-1-42-6

ACQUIRING PERSON STATEMENT

Sec. 6. Any person who proposes to make or has made a control
share acquisition may at the person's election deliver an acquiring
person statement to the issuing public corporation at the issuing public
corporation's principal office. The acquiring person statement must
set forth all of the following:
(1) the identity of the acquiring person and each other member of any group of which the person is a part for purposes
of determining control shares.
(2) a statement that the acquiring person statement is given
pursuant to this chapter.
(3) the number of shares of the issuing public corporation
owned (directly or indirectly) by the acquiring person and each
other member of the group.
(4) the range of voting power under which the control share
acquisition falls or would, if consummated, fall.
(5) if the control share acquisition has not taken place:
(a) a description in reasonable detail of the terms of the
proposed control share acquisition; and
(b) representations of the acquiring person, together with
a statement in reasonable detail of the facts upon which
they are based, that the proposed control share acquisition,
if consummated, will not be contrary to law, and that the
acquiring person has the financial capacity to make the
proposed control share acquisition.
As added by P.L. 149-1986, SEC.26.

23-1-42-7

SPECIAL MEETING OF SHAREHOLDERS
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Sec. 7. (a) If the acquiring person so requests at the time of
delivery of an acquiring person statement and gives an undertaking

to pay the corporation's expenses of a special meeting, within ten (10)
days thereafter, the directors of the issuing public corporation shall
call a special meeting of shareholders of the issuing public corporation
for the purpose of considering the voting rights to be accorded the
shares acquired or to be acquired in the control share acquisition.
(b) Unless the acquiring person agrees in writing to another
date, the special meeting of shareholders shall be held within fifty
(50) days after receipt by the issuing public corporation of the request.
(c) If no request is made, the voting rights to be accorded the
shares acquired in the control share acquisition shall be presented to
the next special or annual meeting of shareholders.
(d) If the acquiring person so requests in writing at the time of
delivery of the acquiring person statement, the special meeting must
not be held sooner than thirty (3) days after receipt by the issuing
public corporation of the acquiring person statement. As added by
P.L.149-1986, SEC.26.
23-1-42-8

NOTICE

Sec. 8. (a) If a special meeting is requested, notice of the special
meeting of shareholders shall be given as promptly as reasonably
practicable by the issuing public corporation to all shareholders of
record as of the record date set for the meeting, whether or not
entitled to vote at the meeting.
(b) Notice of the special or annual shareholder meeting at which
the voting rights are to be considered must include or be accompanied
by both of the following:
(1) A copy of the acquiring person statement delivered to the
issuing public corporation pursuant to this chapter.
(2) A statement by the board of directors of the corporation,
authorized by its directors, of its position or recommendation,
or that it is taking no position or making no recommendation,
with respect to the proposed control share acquisition.
As added by P.L.149-1986, SEC.26.
23-1-42-9

VOTING RIGHTS OF ACQUIRED CONTROL SHARES; RESOLUTION

Sec. 9. (a) Control shares acquired in a control share acquisition
have the same voting rights as were accorded the shares before the
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control share acquisition only to the extent granted by resolution
approved by the shareholders of the issuing public corporation.
(b) To be approved under this section, the resolution must be
approved by:
(1) each voting group entitled to vote separately on the
proposal by a majority of all the votes entitled to be cast by
that voting group, with the holders of the outstanding shares
of a class being entitled to vote as a separate voting group if
the proposed control share acquisition would, if fully carried
out, result in any of the changes described in IC 23-1-38-4(a);
and
(2) each voting group entitled to vote separately on the
proposal by a majority of all the votes entitled to be cast by
that group, excluding all interested shares.
As added by P.L.149-1986, SEC.26.
23-1-42-10

REDEMPTION OF ACQUIRED CONTROL SHARES

Sec. 10 (a) If authorized in a corporation's articles of incorporation or bylaws before a control share acquisition has occurred,
control shares acquired in a control share acquisition with respect to
which no acquiring person statement has been filed with the issuing
public corporation may, at any time during the period ending sixty
(60) days after the law acquisition of control shares by the acquiring
person, be subject to redemption by the corporation at the fair value
thereof pursuant to the procedures adopted by the corporation.
(b) Control shares acquired in a control share acquisition are
not subject to redemption after an acquiring person statement has
been filed unless the shares are not accorded full voting rights by the
shareholders as provided in section 9 of this chapter. As added by
P.L.149-1986, SEC.26.

23-1-42-11

DISSENTERS' RIGHTS; "FAIR VALUE" DEFINED

Sec. 11. (a) Unless otherwise provided in a corporation's articles
of incorporation or bylaws before a control share acquisition has
occurred, in the event control shares acquired in a control share
acquisition are accorded full voting rights and the acquiring person
has acquired control shares with a majority or more of all voting
power, all shareholders of the issuing public corporation have dissenters' rights as provided in this chapter.
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365.

(b) As soon as practicable after such events have occurred, the
board of directors shall cause a notice to be sent to all shareholders
of the corporation advising them of the facts and that they have
dissenters' rights to receive the fair value of their shares pursuant to
IC 23-1-44.
(c) As used in this section, "fair value" means a value not less
than the highest price paid per share by the acquiring person in the
control share acquisition. As added by P.L.149-1986, SEC.26.

Appendix 3
DELAWARE GENERAL CORPORATION LAW

§ 203. BusINEss

COMBINATIONS WITH INTERESTED STOCKHOLDERS

(a) Notwithstanding any other provisions of this chapter, a
corporation shall not engage in any business combination with any
interested stockholder for a period of 3 years following the date that
such stockholder became an interested stockholder, unless (1)prior'
to such date the board of directors of the corporation approved either
the business combination or the transaction which resulted in the
stockholder becoming an interested stockholder, or (2) upon consummation of the transaction which resulted in the stockholder becoming
an interested stockholder, the interested stockholder owned at least
850 of the voting stock of the corporation outstanding at the time
the transaction commenced, excluding for purposes of determining
the number of shares outstanding those shares owned (i) by persons
who are directors and also officers and (ii) employee stock plans in
which employee participants do not have the right to determine
confidentially whether shares held subject to the plan will be tendered
in a tender or exchange offer, or (3) on or subsequent to such date
the business combination is approved by the board of directors and
authorized at an annual or special meeting of stockholders, and not
by written consent, by the affirmative vote of at least 66-2/3% of the
outstanding voting stock which is not owned by the interested stockholder.
(b) The restrictions contained in this section shall not apply if:
(1)the corporation's original certificate of incorporation contains
a provision expressly electing not to be governed by this section:
(2) the corporation, by action of its board of directors, adopts
an amendment to its bylaws within 90 days of the effective date of
this section, expressly electing not to be governed by this section,
which amendment shall not be further amended by the board of
directors.
(3) the corporation, by action of its stockholders, adopts an
amendment to its certificate of incorporation or bylaws expressly
electing not to be governed by this section, provided that, in addition
to any other vote required by law, such amendment to the certificate
of incorporation or bylaws must be approved by the affirmative vote
of a majority of the shares entitled to vote. An amendment adopted
pursuant to this paragraph shall not be effective until 12 months after
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the adoption of such amendment and shall not apply to any business
combination between such corporation and any person who became
an interested stockholder of such corporation on or prior to such
adoption. A by law amendment adopted pursuant to this paragraph
shall not be further amended by the board of directors;
(4) the corporation does not have a class of voting stock that is
(i) listed on a national securities exchange, (ii) authorized for quotation
on an inter dealer quotation system of a registered national securities
association or (iii) held of record by more than 2,000 stockholders,
unless any of the foregoing results from action taken, directly or
indirectly, by an interested stockholder or from a transaction in which
a person becomes an interested stockholder;
(5) a stockholder becomes an interested stockholder inadvertently and (i) as soon as practicable divests sufficient shares so that
the stockholder ceases to be an interested stockholder and (ii) would
not, at any time within the 3 year period immediately prior to a
business combination between the corporation and such stockholder,
have been an interested stockholder but for the inadvertent acquisition; or
(6) the business combination is proposed prior to the consummation or abandonment of and subsequent to the earlier of the public
announcement or the notice required hereunder of a proposed transaction which (i) constitutes one of the transactions described in the
second sentence of this paragraph; (ii) is with or by a person who
either was not an interested stockholder during the previous 3 years
or who became an interested stockholder with the approval of the
corporation's board of directors; and (iii) is approved or not opposed
by a majority of the members of the board of directors then in office
(but not less than 1) who were directors prior to any person becoming
an interested stockholder during the previous 3 years or were recommended for election or elected to succeed such directors by a majority
of such directors. The proposed transactions referred to in the preceding sentence are limited to (x) a merger or consolidation of the
corporation (except for a merger in respect of which, pursuant to
section 251(f) of the chapter, no vote of the stockholders of the
corporation is required); (y) a sale, lease, exchange, mortgage, pledge,
transfer or other disposition (in one transaction or a series of transactions), whether as part of a dissolution or otherwise, of assets of
the corporation or of any direct or indirect majority-owned subsidiary
of the corporation (other than to any direct or indirect wholly-owned
subsidiary or to the corporation) having an aggregate market value
equal to 500 or more of either that aggregate market value of all of
the assets of the corporation determined on a consolidated basis or
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the aggregate market value of all the outstanding stock of the corporation; or (z) a proposed tender or exchange offer for 50% or more
of the outstanding voting stock of the corporation. The corporation
shall give not less than 20 days notice to all interested stockholders
prior to the consummation of any of the transactions described in
clauses (x) or (y) of the second sentence of this paragraph. Notwithstanding paragraphs (1), (2), (3) and (4) of this subsection, a corporation may elect by a provision of its original certificate of incorporation
or any amendment thereto to be governed by this section, provided
that any such amendment to the certificate of incorporation shall not
apply to restrict a business combination between the corporation and
an interested stockholder of the corporation if the interested stockholder became such prior to the effective date of the amendment.
(c) As used in this section only, the term:
(1) 'affiliate' means a person that directly, or indirectly through
one or more intermediaries, controls, or is controlled by, or is under
common control with, another person.
(2) 'associate,' when used to indicate a relationship with any
person, means (i) any corporation or organization of which such
person is a director, officer or partner or is, directly or indirectly, the
owner of 20% or more of any class of voting stock, (ii) any trust or
other estate in which such person has at least a 20% beneficial interest
or as to which such person serves as trustee or in a similar fiduciary
capacity, and (iii) any relative or spouse of such person, or any
relative of such spouse, who has the same residence as such person.
(3) 'business combination,' when used in reference to any corporation and any interested stockholder of such corporation, means:
(i) any merger or consolidation of the corporation or
any direct or indirect majority-owned subsidiary of the corporation with (A) the interested stockholder, or (B) with any
other corporation if the merger or consolidation is caused by
the interested stockholder and as a result of such merger or
consolidation subsection (a) of this section is not applicable
to the surviving corporation;
(ii) any sale, lease, exchange, mortgage, pledge, transfer
or other disposition (in one transaction or a series of transactions), except proportionately as a stockholder of such corporation, to or with the interested stockholder, whether as
part of a dissolution or otherwise, of assets of the corporation
or of any direct or indirect majority-owned subsidiary of the
corporation which assets have an aggregate market value equal
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to 10% or more of either the aggregate market value of all
the assets of the corporation determined on a consolidated
basis or the aggregate market value of all the outstanding
stock of the corporation;
(iii) any transaction which results in the issuance or
transfer by the corporation or by any direct o indirect majority-owned subsidiary of the corporation of any stock of the
corporation or.of such subsidiary to the interested stockholder,
except (A) pursuant to the exercise, exchange or conversion of
securities exercisable for, exchangeable for or convertible into
stock of such corporation or any such subsidiary which securities were outstanding prior to the time that the interested
stockholder became such, (B) pursuant to a dividend or distribution paid or made, or the exercise, exchange or conversion
of securities exercisable for, exchangeable for or convertible
into stock of such corporation or any such subsidiary which
security is distributed, pro rata to all holders of a class or
series of stock of such corporation subsequent to the time the
interested stockholder became such, (C) pursuant to an exchange offer by the corporation to purchase stock made on
the same terms to all holders of said stock, or (D) any issuance
or transfer of stock by the corporation, provided however,
that in no case under (B) - (D) above shall there be an increase
in the interested stockholder's proportionate share of the stock
of any class or series of the corporation or of the voting stock
of the corporation;
(iv) any transaction involving the corporation or any
direct or indirect majority-owned subsidiary of the corporation
which has the effect, directly or indirectly, of increasing the
proportionate share of the stock of any class or series, or
securities convertible into the stock of any class or series, of
the corporation or of any such subsidiary which is owned by
the interested stockholder, except as a result of immaterial
changes due to fractional share adjustments or as a result of
any purchase or redemption of any shares of stock not caused,
directly or indirectly, by the interested stockholder; or
(v) any receipt by the interested stockholder of the benefit, directly or indirectly (except proportionately as a stockholder of such corporation) of any loans, advances, guarantees,
pledges, or other financial benefits (other than those expressly
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permitted in subparagraphs (i)-(iv) above) provided by or
through the corporation or any direct or indirect majority
owned subsidiary.
(4) 'control', including the term 'controlling,' 'controlled by' and
'under common control with,' means the possession, directly or
indirectly, of the power to direct or cause the direction of the
management and policies of a person, whether through the ownership
of voting stock, by contract, or otherwise. A person who is owner of
20% or more of a corporation's outstanding voting stock shall be
presumed to have control of such corporation, in the absence of
proof by a preponderance of the evidence to the contrary. Notwithstanding the foregoing, a presumption of control shall not apply
where such person holds voting stock, in good faith and not for the
purpose of circumventing this section, as an agent, bank, broker,
nominee, custodian or trustee for one or more owners who do not
individually or as a group have control of such corporation.
(5) 'interested stockholder' means any person (other than the
corporation and any direct or indirect majority-owned subsidiary of
the corporation) that (i) is the owner of 15% or more of the outstanding voting stock of the corporation, or (ii) is an affiliate or associate
of the corporation and was the owner of 15% or more of the
outstanding voting stock of the corporation at any time within the 3year period immediately prior to the date on which it is sought to be
determined whether such person is an interested stockholder; and the
affiliates and associates of such person; provided, however, that the
term 'interested stockholder' shall not include (x) any person who (A)
owned shares in excess of the 15% limitation set forth herein as of,
or acquired such shares pursuant to a tender offer commenced prior
to, December 23, 1987 or pursuant to an exchange offer announced
prior to the aforesaid date and commenced within 90 days thereafter
and continued to own shares in excess of such 15% limitation or
would have but for action by the corporation or (B) acquired said
shares from a person described in (A) above by gift, inheritance or in
a transaction in which no consideration was exchanged; or (y) any
person whose ownership of shares in excess of the 15% limitation set
forth herein in the result of action taken solely by the corporation
provided that such person shall be an interested stockholder if thereafter he acquires additional shares of voting stock of the corporation,
except as a result of further corporate action not caused, directly or
indirectly, by such person. For the purpose of determining whether a
person is an interested stockholder, the voting stock of the corporation
deemed to be outstanding shall include stock deemed to be owned by
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the person through application of paragraph (8) of this subsection
but shall not include any other unissued stock of such corporation
which may be issuable pursuant to any agreement, arrangement or
understanding, or upon exercise of conversion rights, warrants or
options, or otherwise.
(6) 'person' means any individual, corporation, partnership, unincorporated association or other entity.
(7) 'voting stock' means stock of any class or series entitled to
vote generally in the election of directors.
(8) 'owner' including the terms 'own' and 'owned' when used
with respect to any stock means a person that individually or with or
through any of its affiliates or associates:
or

(i)

beneficially owns such stock, directly or indirectly:

(ii) has (A) the right to acquire such stock (whether such
right is: exercisable immediately or only after the passage of
time) pursuant to any agreement, arrangement or understanding, or upon the exercise of conversion rights, exchange rights,
warrants or options, or otherwise; provided, however, that a
person shall not be deemed the owner of stock tendered
pursuant to a tender or exchange offer made by such person
or any of such person's affiliates or associates until such
tendered stock is accepted for purchase or exchange; or (B)
the right to vote such stock pursuant to any agreement,
arrangement or understanding; provided, however, that a person shall not be deemed the owner of any stock because of
such person's right to vote such stock if the agreement,
arrangement or understanding to vote such stock arises solely
from a revocable proxy or consent given in response to a
proxy or consent solicitation made to 10 or more persons; or
(iii) has any agreement, arrangement or understanding
for the purpose of acquiring, holding, voting (except voting
pursuant to a revocable proxy or consent as described in item
(B) of clause (ii) of this paragraph), or disposing of such stock
with any other person that beneficially owns, or whose affiliates or associates beneficially own, directly or indirectly, such
stock.
(d) No provision of a certificate of incorporation or bylaw shall
requires, for any vote of stockholders required by this section a
greater vote of stockholders than that specified in this section.
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(e) The Court of Chancery is hereby vested with exclusive jurisdiction to hear and determine all matters with respect to this section."
Section 2. The provisions of this Act are severable and any
provision held invalid shall not affect or impair any of the remaining
provisions of this Act.

Appendix 4
NEW YORK BUSINESS CORPORATION LAW

§ 912. Requirements relating to certain business combinations
(a) For the purposes of this section:
(1) "Affiliate" means a person that directly, or indirectly through
one or more intermediaries, controls, or is controlled by, or is under
common control with, a specified person.
(2) "Announcement date", when used in reference to any business combination, means the date of the first public announcement
of the final, definitive proposal for such business combination.
(3) "Associate", when used to indicate a relationship with any
person, means (A) any corporation or organization of which such
person is an officer or partner or is, directly or indirectly, the
beneficial owner of ten percent or more of any class of voting stock,
(B) any trust or other estate in which such person has a substantial
beneficial interest or as to which such person serves as trustee or in a
similar fiduciary capacity, and (C) any relative or spouse of such
person, or any relative of such spouse, who has the same home as
such person.
(4) "Beneficial owner", when used with respect to any stock,
means a person:
(A) that, individually or with or through any of its affiliates or
associates, beneficially owns such stock, directly or indirectly; or
(B) that, individually or with or through any of its affiliates or
associates, has (i) the right to acquire such stock (whether such right
is exercisable immediately or only after the passage of time), pursuant
to any agreement, arrangement or understanding (whether or not in
writing), or upon the exercise of conversion rights, exchange rights,
warrants or options, or otherwise; provided, however, that a person
shall not be deemed the beneficial owner of stock tendered pursuant
to a tender or exchange offer made by such person or any of such
person's affiliates or associates until such tendered stock is accepted
for purchase or exchange; or (ii) the right to vote such stock pursuant
to any agreement, arrangement or understanding (whether or not in
writing); provided, however, that a person shall not be deemed the
beneficial owner of any stock under this item if the agreement,
arrangement or understanding to vote such stock (X) arises solely
from a revocable proxy or consent given in response to a proxy or
consent solicitation made in accordance with the applicable rules and
regulations under the Exchange Act and (Y) is not then reportable on
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a Schedule 13D under the Exchange Act (or any comparable or
successor report); or
(C) that has any agreement, arrangement or understanding
(whether or not in writing), for the purpose of acquiring, holding,
voting (except voting pursuant to a revocable proxy or consent as
described in item (ii) of clause (B) of this subparagraph), or disposing
of such stock with any other person that beneficially owns, or whose
affiliates or associates beneficially own, directly or indirectly, such
stock.
(5) "Business combination", when used in reference to any
resident domestic corporation and any interested shareholder of such
resident domestic corporation, means:
(A) any merger or consolidation of such resident domestic
corporation or any subsidiary of such resident domestic corporation
with (i) such interested shareholder or (ii) any other corporation
(whether or not itself an interested shareholder of such resident
domestic corporation) which is, or after such merger or consolidation
would be, an affiliate or associate of such interested shareholder;
(B) any sale, lease, exchange, mortgage, pledge, transfer or
other disposition (in one transaction or a series of transactions) to or
with such interested shareholder or any affiliate or associate of such
interested shareholder of assets of such resident domestic corporation
or any subsidiary of such resident domestic corporation (i) having an
aggregate market value of all the assets, determined on a consolidated
basis, of such resident domestic corporation, (ii) having an aggregate
market value equal to ten percent or more of the aggregate market
value of all the outstanding stock of such resident domestic corporation, or (iii) representing ten percent or more of the earning power or
net income, determined on a consolidated basis, of such resident
domestic corporation;
(C) the issuance or transfer by such resident domestic corporation or any subsidiary of such resident domestic corporation (in one
transaction or a series of transactions) of any stock of such resident
domestic corporation or any subsidiary of such resident domestic
corporation which has an aggregate market value equal to five percent
or more of the aggregate market value of all the outstanding stock of
such resident domestic corporation to such interested shareholder or
any affiliate or associate of such interested shareholder except pursuant to the exercise of warrants or rights to purchase stock offered,
or a dividend or exercise of warrants or rights to purchase stock
offered, or a dividend or distribution paid or made, pro rata to all
shareholders of such resident domestic corporation;
(D) the adoption of any plan or proposal for the liquidation or
dissolution of such resident domestic corporation prdposed by, or
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pursuant to any agreement, arrangement or understanding (whether
or not in writing) with, such interested shareholder or any affiliate or
associate of such interested shareholder;
(E) any reclassification of securities (including, without limitation, any stock split, stock dividend, or other distribution of stock in
respect of stock, or any reverse stock split), or recapitalization of
such resident domestic corporation, or any merger or consolidation
of such resident domestic corporation with any subsidiary of such
resident domestic corporation, or any other transaction (whether or
not with or into or otherwise involving such interested shareholder),
proposed by, or pursuant to any agreement, arrangement or understanding (whether or not in writing) with, such interested shareholder
or any affiliate or associate of such interested shareholder, which has
the effect, directly or indirectly, or increasing the proportionate share
of the outstanding shares of any class or series of voting stock or
securities convertible into voting stock of such resident domestic
corporation or any subsidiary of such resident domestic corporation
which is directly or indirectly owned by such interested shareholder
or any affiliate or associate of such interested shareholder, except as
a result of immaterial changes due to' fractional share adjustments;
or
(F) any receipt by such interested shareholder or any affiliate
or associate of such interested shareholder of the benefit, directly or
indirectly (except proportionately as a shareholder of such resident
domestic corporation) of any loans, advances, guarantees, pledges or
other financial assistance or any tax credits or other tax advantages
provided by or through such resident domestic corporation.
(6) "Common stock" means any stock other than preferred
stock.
(7) "Consummation date", with respect to any business combination, means the date of consummation of such business combination, or, in the case of a business combination as to which a
shareholder vote is taken, the later of the business day prior to the
vote or twenty days prior to the date of consummation of such
business combination.
(8) "Control", including the terms "controlling", "controlled
by" and "under common control with", means the possession, directly or indirectly, of the power to direct or cause the direction of
the management and policies of a person, whether through the
ownership of voting stock, by contract, or otherwise. A person's
beneficial ownership of ten percent or more of a corporation's outstanding voting stock shall create a presumption that such person has
control of such corporation. Notwithstanding the foregoing, a7 person
shall not be deemed to have control of a corporation if such person
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holds voting stock, in good faith and not for the purpose of circumventing this section, as an agent, bank, broker, nominee, custodian
or trustee for one or more beneficial owners who do not individually
or as a group have control of such corporation.
(9) "Exchange Act" means the Act of Congress known as the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as the same has been or hereafter
may be amended from time to time.
(10) "Interested shareholder", when used in reference to any
resident domestic corporation, means any person (other than such
resident domestic corporation or any subsidiary of such resident
domestic corporation) that
(A) (i) is the beneficial owner, directly or indirectly, of twenty
percent or more of the outstanding voting stock of such resident
domestic corporation; or
(ii) is an affiliate or associate of such resident domestic corporation and at any time within the five-year period immediately prior
to the date in question was the beneficial owner, directly or indirectly,
of twenty percent or more of the then outstanding voting stock of
such resident domestic corporation; provided that
(B) for the purpose of determining whether a person is an
interested shareholder, the number of shares of voting stock of such
resident domestic corporation deemed to be outstanding shall include
shares deemed to be beneficially owned by the person through application of subparagraph four of this paragraph but shall not include
any other unissued shares of voting stock of such resident domestic
corporation which may be issuable pursuant to any agreement, arrangement or understanding, or upon exercise of conversion rights,
warrants or options, or otherwise.
(11)
"Market value", when used in reference to stock or property of any resident domestic corporation, means:
(A) in the case of stock, the highest closing sale price during
the thirty-day period immediately preceding the date in question of a
share -of such stock on the composite tape for New York stock
exchange-listed stocks, or, if such stock is not quoted on such
composite tape or if such stock is not listed on such exchange, on the
principal United States securities exchange registered under the Exchange Act on which such stock is listed, or, if such stock is not
listed on any such exchange, the highest closing bid quotation with
respect to a share of such stock during the thirty-day period preceding
the date in question on the National Association of Securities Dealers,
Inc. Automated Quotations System or any system then in use, or if
no such quotations are available, the fair market value on the date in
question of a share of such stock as determined by the board of
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directors of such resident domestic corporation in good faith; and
(B) in the case of property other than cash or stock, the fair
market value of such property on the date in question as determined
by the board of directors of such resident domestic corporation in
good faith.
(12) "Preferred stock" means any class or series of stock of a
resident domestic corporation which under the by-laws or certificate
of incorporation of such resident domestic corporation is entitled to
receive payment of dividends prior to any payment of dividends on
some other class or series of stock, or is entitled in the event of any
voluntary liquidation, dissolution or winding up of the resident domestic corporation to receive payment or distribution of a preferential
amount before any payments or distributions are received by some
other class or series of stock.
(13) "Resident domestic corporation" means an issuer of voting
stock which:
(A) is organized under the laws of this state and has its principal
executive offices and significant business operations located in this
state; and
(B) has at least ten percent of its voting stock owned beneficially
by residents of this state. For purposes of this section, the residence
of a partnership, unincorporated association, trust or similar organization shall be the principal office of such organization.
No resident domestic corporation, which is organized under the
laws of this state, shall cease to be a resident domestic corporation
by reason of events occurring or actions taken while such resident
domestic corporation is subject to the provisions of this section.
(14) "Stock" means:
(A) any stock or similar security, any certificate of interest, any
participation in any profit sharing agreement, any voting trust certificate, or any certificate of deposit for stock; and
(B) any security convertible, with or without consideration, into
stock, or any warrant, call or other option or privilege of buying
stock without being bound to do so, or any other security carrying
any right to acquire, subscribe to or purchase stock.
(15) "Stock acquisition date", with respect to any person and
any resident domestic corporation, means the date that such person
first becomes an interested shareholder of such resident domestic
corporation.
(16) "Subsidiary" of any resident domestic corporation means
any other corporation of which voting stock, having a majority of
the outstanding voting stock of such other corporation, is owned,
directly or indirectly, by such resident domestic corporation.
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(17) "Voting stock" means shares of capital stock of a corporation entitled to vote generally in the election of directors.
(b) Notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained in this
chapter (except the provisions of paragraph (d) of this section), no
resident domestic corporation shall engage in any business combination with any interested shareholder of such resident domestic corporation for a period of five years following such interested
shareholder's stock acquisition date unless such business combination
or the purchase of stock made by such interested shareholder on such
interested shareholder's stock acquisition date is approved by the
board of directors of such resident domestic corporation prior to such
interested shareholder's stock acquisition date. If a good faith proposal is made in writing to the board of directors of such resident
domestic corporation regarding a business combination, the board of
directors shall respond, in writing, within thirty days or such shorter
period, if any, as may be required by the Exchange Act, setting forth
its reasons for its decision regarding such proposal. If a good faith
proposal to purchase stock is made in writing to the board of directors
of such resident domestic corporation, the board of directors, unless
it responds affirmatively in writing within thirty days or such shorter
period, if any, as may be required by the Exchange Act, shall be
deemed to have disapproved such stock purchase.
(c) Notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained in this
chapter (except the provisions of paragraphs (b) and (d) of this
section), no resident domestic corporation shall engage at any time in
any business combination with any interested shareholder of such
resident domestic corporation other than a business combination
specified in any one of subparagraph (1), (2) or (3):
(1) A business combination approved by the board of directors
of such resident domestic corporation prior to such interested shareholder's stock acquisition date, or where the purchase of stock made
by such interested shareholder on such interested shareholder's stock
acquisition date had been approved by the board of directors of such
resident domestic corporation prior to such interested shareholder's
stock acquisition date.
(2) A business combination approved by the affirmative vote of
the holders of a majority of the outstanding voting stock not beneficially owned by such interested shareholder or any affiliate or associate
of such interested shareholder at a meeting called for such purpose
no earlier than five years after such interested shareholder's stock
acquisition date.
(3) A business combination that meets all of the following
conditions:
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(A) The aggregate amount of the cash and the market value as
of the consummation date of consideration other than cash to be
received per share by holders of outstanding shares of common stock
of such resident domestic corporation in such business combination
is at least equal to the higher of the following:
(i) the highest per share price paid by such interested shareholder
at a time when he was the beneficial owner, directly or indirectly, of
five .percent or more of the outstanding voting stock of such resident
domestic corporation, for any shares of common stock of the same
class or series acquired by it (X) within the five-year period immediately prior to the announcement date with respect to such business
combination, or (Y) within the five-year period immediately prior to,
or in, the transaction in which such interested shareholder became an
interested shareholder, whichever is higher; plus, in either case, interest
compounded annually from the earliest date on which such highest
per share acquisition price was paid through the consummation date
at the rate for one-year United States treasury obligations from time
to time in effect; less the aggregate amount of any cash dividends
paid, and the market value of any dividends paid other than in cash,
per share of common stock since such earliest date, up to the amount
of such interest; and
(ii) the market value per share of common stock on the announcement date with respect to such business combination or on
such interested shareholder's stock acquisition date, whichever is
higher; plus interest compounded annually from such date through
the consummation date at the rate for one-year United States treasury
obligations from time to time in effect; less the aggregate amount of
any cash dividends paid, and the market value of any dividends paid
other than in cash, per share of common stock since such date, up to
the amount of such interest.
(B) The aggregate amount of the cash and the
market value as
of the consummation date of consideration other than cash to be
received per share by holders of outstanding, shares of any class or
series of stock, other than common stock, of such resident domestic
corporation is at least equal to the highest of the following (whether
or not such interested shareholder has previously acquired any shares
of such class or series of stock):
(i) the highest per share price paid by such interested shareholder
at a time when he was the beneficial owner, directly or indirectly, of
five percent or more of the outstanding voting stock of such resident
domestic corporation, for any shares of such class or series of stock
acquired by it (X) within the five-year period immediately prior to
the announcement date with respect to such business combination, or
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(Y) within the five-year period immediately prior to, or in, the
transaction in which such interested shareholder became an interested
shareholder, whichever is higher; plus, in either case, interest compounded annually from the earliest date on which such highest per
share acquisition price was paid through the consummation date at
the rate of one-year United States treasury obligations from time to
time in effect; less the aggregate amount of any cash dividends paid,
and the market value of any dividends paid other than in cash, per
share of such class or series of stock since such earliest date, up to
the amount of such interest;
(ii) the highest preferential amount per share to which the
holders of shares of such class or series of stock are entitled in the
event of any voluntary liquidation, dissolution or winding up of such
resident domestic corporation, plus the aggregate amount of any
dividends declared or due as to which such holders are entitled prior
to payment of dividends on some other class or series of stock (unless
the aggregate amount of such dividends is included in such preferential
amount); and
(iii) the market value per share of such class or series of stock
on the announcement date with respect to such business combination
or on such interested shareholder's stock acquisition date, whichever
is higher; plus interest compounded annually from such date through
the consummation date at the rate for one-year United States treasury
obligations from time to time in effect; less the aggregate amount of
any cash dividends paid, and the market value of any dividends paid
other than in cash, per share of such class or series of stock since
such date, up to the amount of such interest.
(C) The consideration to be received by holders of a particular
class or series of outstanding stock (including common stock) of such
resident domestic corporation in such business combination is in cash
or in the same form as the interested shareholder has used to acquire
thelargest number of shares of such class or series of stock previously
acquired by it, and such consideration shall be distributed promptly.
(D) The holders of all outstanding shares of stock of such
resident domestic corporation not beneficially owned by such interested shareholder immediately prior to the consummation of such
business combination are entitled to receive in such business combination cash or other consideration for such shares in compliance with
clauses (A), (B) and (C) of this subparagraph.
(E) After such interested shareholder's stock acquisition date
and prior to the consummation date with respect to such business
combination, such interested shareholder has not become the beneficial owner of any additional shares of voting stock of such resident
domestic corporation except:
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(i) as part of the transaction which resulted in such interested
shareholder becoming an interested shareholder;
(ii) by virtue of proportionate stock splits, stock dividends or
other distributions of stock in respect of stock not constituting a
business combination under clause (E) of subparagraph five of paragraph (A) of this section;
(iii) through a business combination meeting all of the conditions of paragraph (b) of this section and this paragraph; or
(iv) through purchase by such interested shareholder at any
price which, if such price had been paid in an otherwise permissible
business combination the announcement date and consummation date
of which were the date of such purchase, would have satisfied the
requirements of clauses (A), (B) and (C) of this subparagraph.
(d) The provisions of this section shall not apply:
(1) to any business combination of a resident domestic corporation that does not have a class of voting stock registered with the
Securities and Exchange Commission pursuant to section twelve of
the Exchange Act, unless the certificate of incorporation provides
otherwise; or
(2) to any business combination of a resident domestic corporation whose certificate of incorporation has been amended to provide
that such resident domestic corporation shall be subject to the provisions of this section, which did not have a class of voting stock
registered with the Securities and Exchange Commission pursuant to
section twelve of the Exchange Act on the effective date of such
amendment, and which is a business combination with an interested
shareholder whose stock acquisition date is prior to the effective date
of such amendment; or
(3) to any business combination of a resident domestic corporation (k) the original certificate of incorporation of which contains
a provision expressly electing not to be governed by this section, or
(ii) which adopts an amendment to such resident domestic corporation's by-laws prior to March thirty-first, nineteen hundred eightysix, expressly electing not to be governed by this section, or (iii) which
adopts an amendment to such resident domestic corporation's bylaws, approved by the affirmative vote of the holders, other than
interested shareholders and their affiliates and associates, of a majority of the outstanding voting stock of such resident domestic corporation, excluding the voting stock of interested shareholders and their
affiliates and associates, expressly electing not to be governed by this
section, provided that such amendment to the by-laws shall not be
effective until eighteen months after such vote of such resident
domestic corporation's shareholders and shall not apply to any business combination of such resident domestic corporation with an
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interested shareholder whose stock acquisition date is on or prior to
the effective date of such amendment; or
(4) to any business combination of a resident domestic corporation with an interested shareholder of such resident domestic corporation which became an interested shareholder inadvertently, if
such interested shareholder (i) as soon as practicable, divests itself of
a sufficient amount of the voting stock of such resident domestic
corporation so that it no longer is the beneficial owner, directly or
indirectly, of twenty percent or more of the outstanding voting stock
of such resident domestic corporation, and (ii) would not at any time
within the five-year period preceding the announcement date with
respect to such business combination have been an interested shareholder but for such inadvertent acquisition.
(5) to any business combination with an interested shareholder
who was the beneficial owner, directly or indirectly, of five per cent
or more of the outstanding voting stock of such resident domestic
corporation on October thirtieth, nineteen hundred eighty-five, and
remained so to such interested shareholder's stock acquisition date.

Appendix 5

SYNOPSIS OF MODEL STATE CONTROL SHARE ACT AND
SUMMARY OF PRINCIPAL DIFFERENCES BETWEEN MODEL
ACT AND INDIANA STATUTE
The attached Model State Control Share Act ("Model Act" or
"Act") has been drafted by a Joint Committee comprised of members
of the Tender Offer Regulation Committee of the North American
Securities Administrators Association and members of the State Regulation of Securities Committee of the American Bar Association.
The Act is based upon the Indiana control share statute declared
constitutional by the United States Supreme Court in CTS Corp. v.
Dynamics Corp. Some 29 states, including Delaware, have amended
their business corporation acts to include provisions governing takeovers, of which approximately 15 are of the control share variety.
The Model Act, like the Indiana statute, applies only to domestic
corporations that meet specific criteria relating to minimum number
of percentage of resident shares or shareholders. Jurisdiction attaches
within 12 months after the effective date of the Act unless the
corporation, by vote of its shareholders, determines to opt out of the
Act's coverage. However, unlike the Indiana statute, in order that a
corporation be automatically covered by the Model Act, it must be a
corporation that has its securities registered under sec. 12 of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 or subject to sec. 15(d) of that Act.
The Model Act does not require the economic nexus criteria present
in the Indiana and other statutes, such as principal place of business,
substantial assets and number of employees. (See Section 3(g).).
Corporations that are not automatically covered by the Act may
opt into coverage. However, unlike the Indiana statute, the Model
Act provides certain eligibility criteria that an opting in corporation
must satisfy-namely, a minimum of 100 shareholders of record and
at least one of the shareholder nexus criteria relating to resident shares
or shareholders. (See Section 2(b).).
The Model Act requires that action to opt in or out of the Act
be pursuant to the procedure for amending a corporation's articlesby shareholder vote in addition to a board of directors' resolution.
The comparable Indiana procedures can be implemented through
bylaw changes requiring only board action. (See Sections 2(b) and 4
(Intro).).
The cornerstone of the Model Act (and the Indiana statute) is a
section providing that if a person acquires shares of a corporation to
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which the Act applies in excess of certain thresholds of voting powerone-fifth (20%), one third (33 1/3%) and a majority (over 50%)-.
such shares have no voting power unless restored by vote of holders
of a majority of the "non-interested shares" of the corporation.
Although the Model Act's definition of "control shares," as well as
the three voting control ranges, are the same as the Indiana statute,
the Model act (unlike the Indiana statute) does not affect the voting
rights of shares representing up to 20% of all voting power, as well
as additional shares acquired within a range of voting power for
which shareholder approval has already been obtained. (See Sections
3(e)3I and 4(b) and (c).).
The Model Act does not cover acquisitions by persons who
acquire sares for the benefit of others in the ordinary course of
business (e.g., brokers and nominees), so long as such acquisition is
made in good faith and not for the purpose of circumventing the Act.
In addition, the Act excludes from the definition of "control share
acquisition" the acquisition of shares in any of the following eleven
circumstances:
1. Acquisition at a time when the corporation was not
subject to the Act;
2.

Acquisition pursuant to a contract entered into at a
time when the corporation was not subject to the Act;

3. Acquisition by inheritance;
*4.

Acquisition by inter vivos gift;

*5. Acquisition by transfer among family members or persons under direct common control;
6.

Acquisition by a pledge or other security interest;

7. Acquisition by reason of a merger or plan of consolidation or share exchange, if the corporation is a party
to such transactions;
8. Acquisition from another person where the Act would
otherwise by invoked, provided that the person acquiring such shares does not thereby increase his or her
*

Indicates a Model Act exclusion that is not found in the Indiana statute.

.1988:385]

.APPENDIX 5

voting power to a next higher threshold, and so long as
there is only one such transfer;
*9.

Acquisition of additional shares within the range of
voting power for which approval has already been grated,
or where the range was achieved through an excluded
transaction;

*10.

Where the corporation itself causes an increase in the
person's voting power; and

*11.

Pursuant to the solicitation of proxies.

Not included in the Model Act is the Indiana statute's exclusion
for the acquisition from another person of control shares that had
been grated voting rights following a shareholders' vote.
The shareholder vote approval procedure under Section 5 of the
Model Act is comparable to the approval procedure in the Indiana
statute. To obtain approval, the acquiring person must deliver a
disclosure statement that, among other things, identifies the person,
states the number of shares directly or indirectly owned and the dates
and prices at which such shares were acquired, and represents that
the acquisition was lawful and that the person has the financial
capacity to make it. A special meeting of shareholders then must be
called within 10 days after delivery of the disclosure statement and
must be held not less than 30 days nor more than 50 days after receipt
of the request for the meeting. These time periods are meant to
coordinate with the 60-day period after which tendering shareholders
must be granted withdrawal rights under the federal takeover regulatory scheme in the Williams Act. In determining which shareholders
may vote whether to accord voting rights to control shares, interested
persons such as the acquiring person and officers and employeedirectors of the corporation are excluded. (See Section 3(f).).
The Model Act includes the following provisions regarding the
shareholder vote approval procedure which are not present in the
Indiana statute: (i) a requirement that an acquiring person must
publish in the newspaper, as well as deliver to the corporation, the
disclosure statement (Section 5(a)); (ii) any proxy must be solicited
separately from any offer to purchase shares of the corporation
(Section 5(f); and (iii) if the shareholders reject a resolution to accord
voting rights for control shares, the resolution to accord voting rights
for control shares, the resolution may be presented again for subsequent shareholder votes at special and annual shareholder meetings
(Section 5 (c)).
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Unlike the Indiana statute that requires two separate majority
vote approvals in order for voting rights to be restored to control
shares, the Model Act provides for only one shareholder vote-a
majority of all voting power, excluding "interested shares." (See
Section 5(g).). If a person does not receive shareholder approval for
restoring voting power to his or her control shares, the person has no
voting power for shares above the threshold for which approval is
required. Restoration of voting power other than by shareholder vote
can occur in the following situations specified in Section 4(d) of the
Model Act, neither of which is provided for under the Indiana statute:
(i) where actions by the corporation cause the holder's ownership level
to cross thresholds; and (ii) where control shares are transferred to a
person whose percentage shareholdings will not exceed 20%7.
The bracketed language in Section 4(d) providing for restoration
of voting power following a three-year holding period is an item
regarding which the Joint Committee was unable to reach a consensus.
Consequently, public comments on this item are especially requested.
Remaining differences between the Model Act and the Indiana
statute are: (i) the Model Act deals with competing bids, a subject
Indiana has not addressed (see Section 5(h)); (ii) the Model Act
requires the purchase at a fair price of all remaining shares by an
affiliate of the corporation that has acquired a majority of the
corporation's voting shares within one year after the corporation
opted out of the Act (see Section6); and (iii) the Model Act does not
include the provisions contained in the Indiana statute relating to
redemption by the corporation of acquired control shares and shareholder dissent and appraisal rights. (See the Additional Commentary
at the end of the Public Discussion Draft.)
[STATE] CONTROL SHARE ACT
Preliminary Statement
This model statute and official comments ("Model Act" or
"Act") is intended as a guide for states wishing to enact or amend a
control share acquisition act. The Model Act was drafted by a joint
committee ("Joint Committee") composed of members of the North
American Securities Administrators Association ("NASAA") and
members of the American Bar Association Committee on State Regulation of Securities ("ABA Committee"). [As of the date of this
Public Discussion Draft, neither NASAA nor the ABA Committee
has reviewed or approved the Act.] The Joint Committee members
have made no recommendation as to the desirability of this legislation
for any particular state.
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The need for this kind of Model Act resulted from the growing
number of states considering control share acquisition legislation
following the Supreme Court decision in CTS Corp. v. Dynamics
Corp.,
U.S.
, 107 S.Ct. 1637 (1987) ("CTS"). In CTS, the
Supreme Court held that the Indiana Control Share Acquisition
Chapter ("Indiana Act") was neither preempted by federal law nor
invalid as burdening interstate commerce. Indiana's law is intended
to provide independent shareholders of domestic corporations meeting
certain criteria the power to vote collectively on a proposed change
of corporate control, by deciding whether to accord voting rights to
shares held or to be acquired in excess of certain r .rcentages. The
purpose of the Joint Committee has been to provide a uniform statute
that comes within the constitutional limitations laid down by the
Supreme Court in CTS and responds to the perceived need to modify
or clarify certain provisions of the Indiana Act.
To improve the usefulness of the Model Act, Official Comments
were prepared for each provision aid specifically approved by the
Joint Committee. The Official Comments describe the substantive
decisions made in the drafting of each provision and further explain
the meaning and purpose of the provision. The Model Act generally
utilizes the statutory drafting principles set forth in Drafting Rules
for Uniform or Model Acts promulgated by the National Conference
of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws.
In drafting the Model Act, the Joint Committee departed from
the Indiana statute only for good reason. In addition, the Joint
Committee attempted to adhere to four requirements which emerged
from the CTS decision. First, state tender offer regulation must not
conflict with the federal policy "implicit in the Williams Act... that
independent shareholders faced with tender offers often are at a
disadvantage" and require protection "from the coercive aspects of
some tender offers." 107 S.Ct. at 1646. Second, state tender offer
regulation may allow "shareholders to evaluate the fairness of the
offer collectively" but should not "allow the state government to
interpose its views of fairness between willing buyers and sellers of
shares of the target company." 107 S.Ct. at 1646 (emphasis in
original). Third, state tender offer regulation must "not give either
management or the offeror an advantage in communicating with the
shareholders about the impending offer." 107 S.Ct. at 1646. Fourth,
state regulation may not impose 'unreasonable delay' upon a tender
offer. 107 S.Ct. at 1647 (emphasis in original).
The Supreme Court recognized in CTS that there is some room
for state legislation regulating tender offers which "furthers the
federal policy of investor protection" and is calculated to protect
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legitimate*state interests. 107 S.Ct. at 1647. The Joint Committee did
not consider it to be within its province, in drafting the Model Act,
to resolve all tender offer abuses and problems that states may
legitimately address or to take a position on the underlying policy
issue of the desirability of state take-over regulation. Rather, the
Committee sought only to draft a model control share act that (i)
could serve as a guide for states considering enactment or amendment
of such legislation, (ii) would withstand constitutional scrutiny and
(iii) would be reasonably consistent with the existing framework of
state corporation law and practice.
Section 1. Citation. This Article is known and may be cited as
the [State] Control Share Act.
Section 2. Application. (a) This Article applies to all issuing
public corporations in existence on and after [a date 12 months after
the effective date of this Article].
Commentary to Subsection 2(a). Coverage under this Act is
invoked automatically with respect to those domestic corporations
that meet the definitional criteria of "issuing public corporation" set
forth in subsection 3(g). The voting power of a corporation's shares
becomes subject to these provisions 12 months after the effective date
of the Act, unless the corporation takes the prescribed action to avoid
coverage. The 12-month delay is designed to provide sufficient time
for those corporations that wish to reject the statute's automatic
coverage and take the "opt-out" opportunity presented in Section 4,
without having to call a special shareholders meeting.
(b) A domestic corporation that is not an issuing public corporation but that has one hundred (100) or more shareholders of record
and meets one of the requirements set forth in subparagraph 3(g)(1)B,
or an issuing public corporation to which this Article does not apply,
may elect to be subject to this Article as an issuing public corporation
by amending its articles of incorporation to provide that this Article
shall apply to the corporation as of a specified ate and filing the
amendment in the [Office of the Secretary of State or other appropriate state office] on or before such date.
Commentary to Subsection 2(b). This subsection provides a procedure for domestic corporations that are not automatically covered
by the Act because they do not have all the elements of an "issuing
public corporation" to invoke the Act's coverage by an amendment
to their articles of incorporation. Such "opt-in" also may be utilized
both by an issuing public corporation that wishes coverage to begin
immediately (prior to the expiration of the 12-month delay period)<
and by a corporation that previously opted out. Only about six of
the existing state control share statutes provide an opt-in procedure.
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This subsection also establishes eligibility criteria for a corporation -that does not automatically qualify. as an issuing public corporation. To elect coverage under the Act, a domestic corporation must
have at least 100 shareholders of record and satisfy at least one of
the three requirements listed in subparagraph 3(g)(1)B. That subparagraph-part of the definition of "issuing public corporation" -sets
forth alternative criteria relating to the number (10,000) or percentage
(10o) of resident shareholders, or the percentage (10%) of shares
held by residents of the state.
The procedure to opt into the Act is that prescribed under the
state business corporation law for amending a corporation's articles
of incorporation-typically a board of directors resolution followed
by a shareholder vote-and parallels the procedure to opt-out of the
Act's application. The Joint Committee chose this approach, as
opposed to an amendment to the corporation's bylaws (which can be
accomplished by board action without shareholder involvement, and
which some state control share statutes permit), because the committee
believes this opt-in procedure is an important corporate action that
should require approval by a majority vote of shareholders. Paragraph
2(b) requires that, if the opt-in amendment to the corporation's articles
is approved, it must be filed timely at the Office of the Secretary of
State or other appropriate state office so as to provide public record
and notice that the corporation is covered by the Act.
Section 3. Definitions. As used in this Article,
(a) "Acquiring person" means a person who makes or proposes
to make, or persons acting as a "group" as defined in sec. 13(d)(3)
of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 who make or propose to
make, a control share acquisition; but "acquiring person" does not
include the issuing public corporation.
Commentary to subsection 3(a). The Model Act's definition of
"acquiring person" is new. The term is not found in .any of the
existing state control share acquisition statutes. The Joint Committee
finds it useful, particularly with its reference to Section 13(d)(3) of
the federal Securities Exchange Act of 1934 ("1934 Act") dealing
with the "group" concept. Thus, wherever "acquiring person" appears in the Act, any group (partnership, syndicate or other aggregation of persons acting in concert) is implicated.
(b) "Affiliate" means a person who directly or indirectly controls the corporation. "Control," means the possession, direct or
indirect, of the power to direct or cause the direction of the management and policies of the corporation, whether through the ownership
of voting securities, by contract, or otherwise. A person's beneficial
ownership of ten percent or more of the voting power of a corpora-
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tion's outstanding shares entitled to vote in the election of directors
(except a person holding voting power in good faith as an agent,
bank, broker, nominee, custodian or trustee for one or more beneficial
owners who do not individually or as a group control the corporation)
creates a presumption that the person controls the corporation.
Commentary to Subsection 3(b). The defined term is used several
times in the Act to refer to persons who have an influential role in
the direction of corporate management and policies, particularly with
respect to the voting process. It is taken from the familiar definitions
of "affiliate" and "control" found in Rule 405 under the Securities
Act of 1933 ("1933 Act"), but is narrowed to suit the limited purpose
to which it is put in the Act.
(c) "All voting power" means the aggregate voting power that
the shareholders of an issuing public corporation would have in the
election of directors, except for this Article.
Commentary to Subsection 3(c). This definition of "all voting
power" likewise is unique to the Model Act. The phrase means the
aggregate voting power that shareholders of all classes of the stock
of the issuing public corporation would have in the election of
directors, but for the application of the Act. The principal use of the
definition is in subsiction 5(g), which describes the shareholder vote
taken for the purpose of determining whether or not voting power
will be accorded to the shares that are the subject of a control share
acquisition.
(d) "Control shares" means issued and outstanding shares of an
issuing public corporation that, except for this Article, would have
voting power when added to all other shares of the issuing public
corporation owned of record or beneficially by an acquiring person
or in respect to which that acquiring person may exercise or direct
the exercise of voting power, that would entitle the acquiring person,
immediately after acquisition of the shares (directly or indirectly), to
exercise or direct the exercise of the voting power of the issuing public
corporation in the election of directors within any of the following
ranges of voting power:
(a) One fifth (1/5) or more but less than one-third (1/3) of
all voting power;
(2) One third (1/3) or more but less than a majority of all
voting power; or
(3) A majority or more of all voting power.
Commentary to Subsection 3(d). Although the definition of
"control shares" in the Model Act is the same in all material respects
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as the definition in the Indiana statute (as well as most other state
control share laws), the Model Act uses the definition somewhat
differently. "Control shares" are equity securities of an issuing public
corporation that, were it not for the Act, would permit the acquiring
person voting power in the election of corporate directors in excess
of any of the three thresholds specified-one fifth, one-third or a
majority. The reason for the triple threshold, according to the drafting
commentary to the Indiana control share statute, is that: (i) 20% is
the level of ownership at which, under equity accounting rules, a
corporation may report the results of its investment in another corporation may report the results of its investment in another corporation as a line item on its financial statements; (ii) 33% is generally
recognized as a sufficient block of shares to constitute effective control
for most, if not all, practical purposes where a public corporation's
shareholders are generally dispersed; and (iii) a majority or more of
voting power comprises literal control.
As used in the Model Act, "control shares" are all shares owned
of record or beneficially by the acquiring person (including shares
acquired in separate purchases over an extended period of time) that,
when added to all other holdings of the acquiring person, entitle the
acquiring person to exercise voting power in excess of one or more
of the three specified thresholds of voting power. There is a difference
between the Model Act and the Indiana statute with respect to the
treatment of voting rights for control shares representing less than
20% of all voting power, and for control shares acquired within a
range of voting power for which approval has already been obtained.
See Commentary to subsections 4(b) and (c). Thus, while the Indiana
statute and most of the other state control share laws emphasize the
concept of the acquisition, the Model Act's focus is on the control
shares themselves-the means of exercising control. the other statutes
attempt to identify the transaction constituting the control share
acquisition, and then sterilize shares involved in that transaction. For
purposes of the Model Act, however, it doesn't matter which shares
were involved in the control share acquisition transaction (so long as
such a transaction occurred) and which shares were previously held.
The consequence with respect to the voting rights of both kinds of
shares is the same.
The definition provides that it is a person's actual ability to
control the voting power over the requisite percentage of shares-and
not merely record ownership-that is the key to determining whether
the shares are "control shares." The definition includes both shares
"owned of record or beneficially by an acquiring person" (covering
the right to acquire the shares) and shares "in respect to which that
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acquiring person may exercise or direct the exercise of voting power."
Additionally, the acquisition of control shares comes under the statute
whether it occurs "directly or indirectly." Because the term "acquiring
person" is defined to include a "group/" an acquisition either by
one person alone or by two or more persons acting cooperatively or
in concerned is covered. The reference to voting power "in the election
of directors" is intended to deal with the situation in which the voting
power of certain series or classes of a corporation's stock may be
limited to specific issues. It is only voting power in electing the
company's directors that is considered. in the definition of "control
shares.
(e) (1) "Control share acquisition" means acquisition by any
person of ownership of, or the power to direct the exercise of
voting power with respect to, control shares.
Commentary to Subsection 3(e). Paragraph 3(e)(1) defines the phrase
"control share acquisition" with language that is nearly identical to
that contained in the other state control share statutes enacted to
date-with the exception that the Model Act language does not include
a provision establishing a conclusive presumption that shares acquired
during any 90-day period are deemed to have been acquired in the
same acquisition. This device for identifying the transaction (or series
of transactions) that constitutes a control share acquisition is unnecessary here because the Act affects the voting rights only of control
shares held in excess of the applicable percentage. Identification of
the transaction in which the control shares were acquired is irrelevant.
Thus, the Act allows more certainty than other state statutes in
determining whether and when a control share acquisition has taken
place.
(2) A person who acquires shares in the ordinary course
of business for the benefit of others in good faith and not for
the purpose of circumventing this Article has not made a
control share acquisition of shares in respect of which that
person is not able to exercise or direct the exercise of votes
without further instruction from others.
Paragraph 3(e)(2) excludes from the definition of "control share
acquisition" acquisitions made by persons, such as brokers or nominees, who acquire shares for the benefit of others in the ordinary
course of business, so long as (i) the acquisition is made "in good
faith and not for the purpose of circumventing" the Act, and (ii) the
acquirer is not "able to exercise or direct the exercise of votes without
further instruction from others" (typically, the beneficial owner). This

1988:3851

APPENDIX 5

type of provision is present in the Indiana law and in 10 of the other
state control share statutes. The exclusion is designed to avoid application of the Act where, as part of normal commercial practices,
record ownership of shares may be in the name of a broker or other
nominee, but where actual voting power with respect to those shares
is held by the broker's customer or the nominees principal. If,
however, voting power for such shares is not subject to such further
instruction or direction from beneficial owners, but rather may be
exercised independently by the broker or nominee, the exclusion does
not apply. Moreover, the exclusion cannot be used to circumvent the
chapter-such as where a broker's purchases for clients are in fact
being made in concerned with, and as part of an effort to assist, an
acquiring person's plans to obtain effective voting control.
(3) The acquisition of any control shares does not constitute a control share acquisition if the acquisition is made in
good faith and not for the purpose of circumventing this
Article in any of the following circumstances:
Paragraph 3(e)(3) contains eleven express exclusions from the
definition of control share acquisition. There is considerable consistency among the states that have enacted control share statutes as to
what transactions should not invoke the statutes' voting rights limitations and procedures. The exclusions generally cover: (i) transactions
that, as a practical matter, do not carry the threat of a corporate
takeover; (ii) transactions as to which director and collective shareholder approval are already required by another corporate law procedure; and (iii) transactions as to which equitable considerations
argue against application of the Act. Each of the acquisitions described must be "made in good faith and not for the purpose of
circumventing" the Act in order to qualify for the exclusion.
A. At a time when the corporation was not subject to this
Article.
B. Pursuant to a contract entered into at a time when the
corporation was not subject to this Article.
Subparagraphs 3(e)(3)A and B exclude share acquisitions that are
made, or that result from a contract entered into at a time when the
Act does not apply to the corporation. For constitutional and essential
fairness reasons, the statute's provisions affecting control share voting
power should only cover acquisitions (and contracts for acquisitions)
which occur when the corporation is subject to the ACt. Investors,
then, can take it into consideration as they make their investment
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decisions. Conversely, acquisitions occurring, or contracts to acquire
entered into, at a time when the corporation was not subject to the
Act (either because the acquisition occurred before the effective date
of the Act or because the corporation did not satisfy the definitional
criteria of an issuing public corporation or had opted out) are
excluded, even if subsequent events trigger application of the Act.
C. Pursuant to the laws of descent and distribution [citation,
if desired].
Subparagraph 3(e)(3)C excludes shares acquired pursuant to the
laws of descent and distribution. This is an exclusion contained in
one form or another in all of the existing state control share statutes,
and is based on the rationale that the acquisition of shares in such
circumstances almost never alters the basic pattern of concentration
of voting power in a corporation.
D.

By a donee under an inter vivos gift.

Subparagraph 3(e)(3)D excludes shares acquired by a donee under
an inter vivos gift. The exclusion is present in several of the state
control share statutes, although not the Indiana statute. The Joint
Committee regards this exclusion as having a similar rationale to that
of the previous subparagraph. An inter vivos gift-from one living
person to another-does not typically involve a change in the factors
affecting corporate control. It most closely resembles (except that
there is no death involved) a grantor or testator pursuant to a will or
otherwise transferring shares without consideration. The effect on the
corporation and its other shareholders is ordinarily nil. Of course,
the g"good faith" and "circumvention" language of the introductory
clause apply to prevent the abuse of this exclusion.
E. Pursuant to a transfer between or among immediate
family members, or between or among persons under direct
common control.
Subparagraph 3(e)(3)E is an exclusion found only in the Model
Act covering transfers between or among immediate family members,
or between or among individuals or entities under direct common
control. Control is typically presumed upon beneficial ownership of
ten percent or more of voting power. Immediate family members, as
well as commonly controlled persons, almost certainly will be included
in the definition of "acquiring person" by virtue of the "group"
concept, and such a transfer does not change the control balance in
the corporation. In other words, separate shareholdings by immediate
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family members or persons commonly controlled, in all circumstances
contemplated by the Joint Committee, will be aggregated for purposes
of determining whether a control share acquisition has occurred or
will occur. Transfers between and among these individuals or entities
have little or no effect.
F. Pursuant to the satisfaction of a pledge or other security
interest.
Subparagraph 3(e)(3)F provides an exclusion for shares acquired
in satisfaction of a pledge or security interest, again with the "good
faith" and lack of circumvention motivation. This exclusion is described in the commentary to the Indiana statute as being necessary
and appropriate because such pledges will normally be made by one
or a relatively small number of shareholders who already own shares
within one of the ranges of voting power covered by the Act, and
foreclosure of the pledge will normally affect no fundamental change
in the patter or the concentration of voting power. All existing state
control share laws contain a form of this exclusion.
G. Pursuant to a merger of plan of consolidation or share
exchange effected in compliance with [citation], if the issuing
public corporation is a party to the agreement of merger or
plan of consolidation or share exchange.
Subparagraph 3(e)(3)G excludes a transaction in which the control
shares are acquired pursuant to a merger, consolidation or share
exchange where an issuing public corporation is a party to the
agreement. Present in all state control share statutes enacted to date,
this provision is based on the premise that a share acquisition using
such methods will either already have been approved by shareholders
or would meet one of the statutory exceptions to the shareholder
approval process (such as short-form mergers and parent-subsidiary
mergers). The Model Act exclusion also specifically includes consolidations, not contained in the Indiana statute (although present in
certain of the other states' statutes), inasmuch as a consolidation is
similar in all relevant respects to a merger or share exchange.
H. From any person whose previous acquisition of control
shares would have constituted a control share acquisition but
for this paragraph 3(c)(3) (other than this subparagraph
3(e)(3)H), provided the acquisition does not result in the
acquiring person holding voting power within a higher range
of voting power than that of the person from whom the
control shares were acquired.
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Subparagraph 3(e)(3)H accords an exclusion for the acquisition
of shares from any person whose previous acquisition would have
been a control share acquisition but for application of paragraph
3(e)(3) (that is, this paragraph containing the exclusions). This "previous exclusion" provision is included in most of the other state
control share statutes. The parenthetical language is new, however,
and prevents the use of this exclusion in more than one transfer. The
Joint Committee believes there to be little justification in allowing
this exclusion to apply indefinitely to a block of control shares where
the transaction in which the block is acquired does not itself qualify
for an exclusion. Also new is the language limiting the exclusion to
transfers that do not result in a higher (unapproved) range of voting
power. "Range of voting power" refers to the categories established
in subsection 3(d).
I. Acquisition by a person of additional shares within the
range of voting power for which such person has received
approval pursuant to Section 5 or within the range of voting
power resulting from shares acquired in a transaction described
in this paragraph 3(e)(3).
Subparagraph 3(e)(3)I is a provision unique to the Model Act,
but may simply make explicit what is implicit in other control share
statutes. It accords an exclusion to the acquisition by a person of
additional shares within the range of voting power for which such
person has already received stockholder approval, and within the
range of voting power enjoyed by someone who acquired shares in a
transaction excluded from the definition of "control share acquisition" under these subparagraphs. Again, "range of voting power"
refers to the categories described in subsection 3(d). As an example
of the application of this provision, all of the shares acquired by a
legatee of 22 percent of the outstanding stock of an issuing public
corporation who then purchases in the market an additional ten
percent, retain their full voting rights by virtue of subparagraph
3(e)(3)C (with respect to the 22 percent) and subparagraph 3(e)(3)I
(with respect to the ten percent). The acquisition of another 2 percent,
however, bringing the total to 34 percent, would constitute a control
share acquisition and invoke Section 4 of the Act as to that 2 percent.

J. An increase in voting power resulting from any action
taken by the issuing public corporation, provided the person
whose voting power is thereby affected is not an affiliate of
the corporation.
Subparagraph 3(e)(3)J is another exclusion that has no counterpart in existing statutes. It covers what might be considered "passive
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threshold crossing" situations. This occurs where, by reason of actions
taken by the issuing public corporation, the subject shareholder's
voting power is changed to an extent that it exceeds a control
threshold. The Joint Committee feels an express exclusion is appropriate for this situation, even though one might argue that such an
occurrence does not constitute an "acquisition." In any event, an
increase in voting power that results from acts of the corporatione.g., a redemption of shares, changes in share voting rights or capital
structure, etc.-where the person holding shares whose voting power
is affected thereby does not control the corporation's actions, should
not constitute a "control share acquisition," even though it may come
within the literal definition.
K. Pursuant to the solicitation of proxies subject to Regulation 14A under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 or
[citation to applicable state corporation statute].
Subparagraph 3(e)(3)K is an exclusion drafted by the Joint Committee to clarify that proxy solicitations are excluded from coverage
of the Act. The exclusion refers to proxy solicitations both by 1934
Act reporting companies and by non-1934 Act companies that choose
to be subject to the Model Act. Without such an exclusion, ordinary
proxy solicitations would regularly result in a control share acquisition
by the soliciting person in acquiring the power to direct the exercise
of voting power of 20% or more. Proxy contests, while certainly
having implications for corporate control, do not present the same
threats to shareholder well-being that share acquisitions do.
Several other exclusions from the definition of control share
acquisition that are contained in various of the existing state control
share laws have not been included in the Model Act. Specifically, an
exclusion for issuer benefit plans (as defined) was not adopted, in
that management often is in a position to control the vote of those
shares. Nor was the Joint Committee convinced of the need for an
exclusion for resales by securities brokers or underwriters, which is
found in several of the statutes. Finally, an exclusion covering acquisitions of control shares directly from the corporation is viewed by
the Joint Committee as unduly favoring management ind evidencing
a "business protectionism" motivation, particularly since it can be
used as a first step in a management buyout series of transactions.
Perhaps the most significant difference between the Model Act
and the Indiana statute with respect to exclusions is that the Model
Act does not contain an exclusion for the acquisition from another
person of control shares as to which shareholders previously granted
voting rights pursuant to the Act. It was the Joint Committee's
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determination not to include such an exclusion on the basis that the
purposes of a control share statute have more to do with the identity,
characteristics and plans of the specific acquiring person than with
the block of stock. Accordingly, shareholders acting collectively should
determine whether the new acquiring person should be allowed voting
rights, based upon information contained in the disclosure statement
and other facts brought to the shareholders' attention. An undisclosed
transferee of such person, who did not receive approval from the
shareholders for the voting rights of the block of control shares, may
be as objectionable to the shareholders as the prior control shareholder
was unobjectionable. Further, even though the absence of a "previous
approval" exclusion may restrict somewhat the holder's ability to
alienate control shares that have become, in all respects, the same as
all other shares of the corporation by virtue of the shareholder
approval process, such person still has an opportunity under the Act
to sell blocks that will not be denied voting rights (up to 20% of a
corporation's shares to a person who holds no other shares), thus
reducing the hardship involved in owning a large block of control
shares.
(f) "Interested shares" means the shares of an issuing public
corporation in respect of which any of the following. persons may
exercise or direct the exercise, as of the applicable record date, of the
voting power of the corporation in the election of directors, other
than solely by the authority of a revocable proxy:
(1) The acquiring person.
(2) Any officer of the issuing public corporation.
(3) Any employee of the issuing public corporation who is
also a director of the corporation.
Commentary to Subsection 3(f). The concept of "interested
shares" is used in the Act for the purpose of identifying which shares
will be permitted to vote on whether an acquiring person's control
shares will be accorded voting rights, and is largely unrelated to the
concept of "control shares." Even control shares that have been
accorded voting rights pursuant to the procedures herein are voteless
"interested shares" in a shareholder vote on a subsequent control
share acquisition by the holder. The language of the definition, and
the three categories of persons covered, are virtually identical to most
existing state control share acts (with the exception of Wisconsin,
which has only one threshold at one-fifth (1/5) beyond which voting
power is diminished by 90%, and which permits all persons to vote
all of their shares on the voting rights resolution).
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"Interested shares" under the Model Act are those owned, or
the voting power of which is exercised or directed, by (i) the acquiring
person; (ii) any officer of the issuing public corporation; and (iii) any
employee of the issuing public corporation who is also a director of
the corporation. The Joint Committee considered suggestions to expand the definition to include holders of 10% or more of the stock
and outside directors, but was not persuaded of the need to disenfranchise either of these categories. The "direct the exercise" language
is intended to cover situations involving beneficial ownership and
ownership by immediate family members and commonly controlled
persons, as well as entities (such as employee stock option plans and
voting trusts) a majority of the trustees of which are persons described
in this subsection.
The major premise underlying the "interested share: concept is
that the right to approve the exercise of control of an issuing public
corporation should rest with owners of the corporation whose interest
in the decision is solely as a pretransaction shareholder. As is pointed
out in the Indiana commentary, the acquiring person's interest in the
control share vote is obvious, and the interest of officers and "inside"
directors is in preserving corporate positions which might be threatened by an acquisition. Thus, the shares held by these persons are
"interested shares." The U.S. Supreme Court's decision in the CTS
case specifically held that the Indiana statute's definition of "interested shares" was consistent with that statute's shareholder protection
purposes in that it disqualified both the acquirer and inside management of the target corporation from voting on whether to grant voting
rights to the acquirer's control shares. Moreover, this is one of the
ways the Model Act "protects the independent shareholder against
both of the contending parties. . . further[ing] a basic purpose of the
Williams Act, 'plac[ing] investors on an equal footing with the
takeover bidder [citations omitted]'." 107 S. Ct. 1645.
The Model Act's definition deals with two additional items: It
clarifies the point in time at which the determination is made as to
whether shares are "interested shares"-the record date. Most state
statutes may be read as implying that this determination is made as
of the meeting date. Also, the definition excludes from the category
of "interested shares" those voted solely under the authority of a
revocable proxy. This proviso appears necessary to permit management and the acquiring person to solicit proxies in connection with
the meeting without thereby sterilizing those shares for the critical
vote.
(g) (1) "Issuing public corporation" means a domestic corporation that has
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A. any securities registered under section 12 or is subject
to section 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and
B.

either

(i) more than ten percent (10%F) of its shareholders resident in [state];
(ii)

more than ten percent (10%) of its shares owned by

[state] residents; or
(iii)

ten thousand (10,000) shareholders resident in [state].

(2) The residence of a shareholder is presumed to be the
address appearing in the records of the corporation.
(3) Shares held by banks (except as trustee or guardian),
brokers or nominees are disregarded for purposes of calculating the percentages and numbers in this subsection 3(g).
Commentary to Subsection 3(g). Paragraph 3(g)(1) defines which
corporations are "issuing public corporations" subject to the Act.
While the Model Act follows certain of the definitional provisions of
the Indiana statute, the definition in the Act differs in several significant respects.
As an initial matter, the company must be a domestic corporation, which is to say that it is subject to the state business corporation
statute under which the Model Act will be adopted. Whereas the
Indiana statute and the majority of the other state control share
statutes restrict coverage to corporations chartered in those states,
several states that enacted control share statutes after the CTS decision
(Oklahoma, North Carolina, Massachusetts, Florida and Arizona)
include within the coverage of their laws non-domiciled corporations
with a strong economic nexus to the state. The emergence of postCTS state control share laws that extended applicability to nondomestic corporations has resulted in vigorous calls for state preemption by
some members of Congress and others, on the grounds that such laws
would result in a "balkanization" of state takeover regulation. Where
nondomestic corporations can be regulated by a state's control share
statute, it is argued, a takeover offer for a particular corporation can
be regulated by a state's control share statute, it is argued, a takeover
offer for a particular corporation can be subject to the laws of more
than one state involving conflicting requirements and procedures and
making compliance with all of the applicable laws impossible.
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In the CTS decision, the Supreme Court concluded that the
Indiana Act did not create the risk of inconsistent state regulation,
stating: "The Indiana Act poses no such problem. So long as each
State regulates voting rights only in the corporations it has created,
each corporation will be subject to the law of only one state. No
principle of corporation law and practice is more firmly established
than a state's authority to regulate domestic corporations, including
the authority to define the voting rights of shareholders." 107 S.Ct.
1649.
In November 1987, the constitutionality of a state control share
statute that sought to cover nondomestic corporations was addressed
by a federal district court in TLX Acquisition Corp v. Telex Corporation (No, CIV-87-2056-R; WD Okla. Nov. 3, 1987). In its decision,
the court concluded that the Oklahoma control share statute, insofar
as it sought to cover nondomestic corporations, was unconstitutional
under the Commerce Clause. The result in the TLX case may have
been predicted for the CTS decision in which the Supreme Court
stated: "We agree that Indiana has no interest in protecting nonresident shareholders of nonresident corporations." 107 S.Ct. 1651.
It remains unclear from the language of CTS whether additional
nexus criteria-beyond the requirement of being a domestic corporation-are necessary to ensure the Commerce Clause constitutionality
of a control share statute, or are only "make weight" items. Clearly,
the inclusion of these additional nexus criteria creates a possibility
that some publicly held corporations will not automatically qualify as
issuing public corporations in any Model Act states. Moreover, these
tests are rarely accurate in revealing the true extent of home-state
shareholdings, due to the prevalence of beneficial (nominee) ownership. Some Joint Committee members would prefer to eliminate all
shareholder nexus criteria. However, the Committee determined that
it is appropriate to include the resident shareholders and resident
share tests in the Act because of the CTS language which indicated
that the shareholder nexus criteria reinforced the Indiana Law's
constitutionality for Commerce Clause purposes. The court stated at
107 S.Ct. 1652: "Moreover, unlike the Illinois statute invalidated in
MITE, the Indiana Act applies only to corporations that have a
substantial number of shareholders in Indiana. Thus, every application
of the Indiana Act will affect a substantial number of Indiana
residents, whom Indiana indisputably has an interest in protecting."
Thus, the Model Act definition in subparagraph 3(g)(l)B, contains the identical three alternative criteria used in the Indiana statute
requiring either: (i) more than 10 0 of the corporation's shareholders
resident in the state; (ii) more than 10% of the corporation's shares
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held by state residents; or (iii) 10,000 resident shareholders.
One of the substantive changes from the Indiana statute's definition which was made by the Joint Committee has to do with
economic (as opposed to shareholder) nexus criteria. As a matter of
policy, the Committee determined that factors relating to principal
place of business, substantial assets and number of employeescriteria that are present in most of the state control share statutes
enacted to date-should not be included in the Model Act. The
principal reason for the Committee's decision was that those factors
smack of local business protectionism, an objective that the Joint
Committee sought to avoid. Moreover, the presence of such criteria
raise Commerce Clause questions which, after CTS, can be avoided
by applying the Act with reference only to the residency of the
corporation and its shareholders.
The second major departure in the Model Act from the Indiana
definition is the Joint Committee's decision to base automatic eligibility under the Act as an "issuing public corporation" on the
domestic corporation's status as a reporting company under the
federal 1934 Act. The Committee regards the Act as a safeguard for
the rights of stockholders primarily of "public" companies, and not
for those of close corporations and corporations with relatively few
investors. Typically, companies with a small number of shareholders
have a more personal relationship with them, and those stockholders
often are more active in monitoring and even participating in, the
affairs of the corporation. The 1934 Act's standard for delineating
between a public company and one that might be regarded as "private" is commonly understood and easy to apply. Private companies
are given the authority, however, to choose to be treated by the Act
like a public company. Accordingly, subparagraph 3(g)(l)A provides
that the definition covers only corporations that have securities registered under Section 12 of the 1934 Act or are subject to Section
15(d) of the 1934 Act. These companies are automatically "issuing
public corporations" unless they opt out. Reference was not included
to companies under Section 12(b)(2)(G) of the 1934 Act (insurance
companies), although states enacting a control share statute that wish
to extend automatic coverage eligibility to such companies can do so
by adding the phrase "or exempted from registration by s. 12(g)(2)(G)
of that Act" at the appropriate place. The Joint Committee recognizes
that many companies in regulated industries (e.g., banks, utilities,
communications firms, etc.) are subject to special change of control
requirements that may or may not be consistent with the Act's theme.
Paragraph 3(g)(2) follows language present in most of the state
control share laws, including Indiana's, establishing a conclusive
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presumption for purposes of determining whether a corporation meets
any of the three alternative "residency" requirements in subparagraph
3(g)(1)B. For pragmatic reasons it is presumed that a shareholder's
residence is the address appearing in the records of the corporation,
although the Committee acknowledges that this residency test is far
from perfect. Such language is also consistent with provisions in most
state business corporation laws prescribing where written notice to
shareholders is to be directed.
Subparagraph 3(g)(3) is also patterned after comparable provisions in other state statutes. It provides that shares held by banks
(except as trustee or guardian), brokers or nominees are disregarded
for purposes of calculating the percentages or numbers of shareholders
in the determination of whether a corporation is an "issuing public
corporation" subject to the Act. The effect of this rather arbitrary
rule is to prevent what would otherwise be the case for most publicly
held companies with large percentages of their stock held in "street
name"-that is, New York residency for the predominance of their
shares and shareholders.
(h) "Person" means any individual, corporation, partnership,
unincorporated association or other entity.
Commentary to Subsection 3(h). Subsection 3(h) defines "person"
consistent with the standard definitional language in most state business corporation laws to mean "any individual, corporation, partnership, unincorporated association or other entity."
Section 4. Voting Rights of Control Shares. Unless otherwise
provided in the articles of incorporation before either a control share
acquisition occurs or a disclosure statement is delivered, control shares
that are the subject of a control share acquisition have only such
voting rights as are accorded under this Section 4.
The heart of this Model Control Share Act is Section 4, which
has the effect of reducing or eliminating entirely the voting power of
control shares acquired in a control share acquisition unless those
voting rights are restored pursuant to a procedure involving a shareholder vote. The shareholders thus are given a collective role in
determining whether a newly-acquired or to-be-acquired concentration
of shares of an issuing public corporation will be permitted any
influence in the governance of that corporation. As a practical matter,
it forces the acquiring person (1) negotiate with the corporation's
board of directors regarding a proposed change of control; or (2)
persuade the corporation's shareholders (by making a sufficiently
favorable offer or otherwise) to approve the acquiring person's voting
power. Such a result tends to reduce the coercive aspects of a hostile
tender offer, while furthering the philosophical rationale for this
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statute of permitting pre-transaction shareholders of the corporation
to deal with the acquiring person collectively. Also, it is presumed
that such an effect will encourage more equitable distribution of the
control premium.
The section begins with an express "opt-out" clause permitting
a corporation that would otherwise be subject to the voting rights
limitations of the statute, through amendment to its articles of incorporation (by the ordinary means provided in the corporate law), to
make this Article inapplicable. Such action must be taken prior to the
time a control share acquisition occurs or a disclosure statement is
delivered to avoid implicating the "opt-out" decision in the control
share voting procedure. Most of the existing state control share laws
(all but Hawaii and North Carolina) include opt-out provisions,
although some of these permit an opt-out by amendment to the
bylaws rather than the corporate charter. The Joint Committee believes that the decision whether this statute will or will not apply to
the corporation should be made by the shareholders. See also Section
6 and Commentary thereto.
(a) Subject to subsections (b)-(d) of this Section 4, the voting
power of control shares having voting power of one-fifth (1/5) or
more of all voting power is reduced to zero unless the shareholders
of the issuing public corporation approve a resolution pursuant to the
procedure set forth in Section 5 according the shares the same voting
rights as they had before they became control shares.
Commentary to Subsection 4(a). This is the operative subsection of
the statute. It clarifies an ambiguity found in a number of the state
statutes, including Indiana's, as to exactly what happens to the voting
rights of control shares in a control share acquisition. Some of the
statutes, cryptically, state that such control shares "have only such
voting rights as are conferred" by this chapter. The Model Act makes
absolutely clear that, except as otherwise provided in the Act, such
shares have no voting rights, unless they are approved by the disinterested shareholders.
(b) Except as provided in subsection 5(g), the voting power of
control shares representing voting power of less than one-fifth (1/5)
of all voting power is not affected by this Article.
Commentary to Subsection 4(b). The Joint Committee chose a different approach to sterilization of control shares from that found in the
Indiana statute and most other state control share laws. Rather than
reducing to zero the voting rights of the shares acquired in a transaction (or series of transactions within 90 days) that carries the
acquiring person over the control share threshold, leaving the earlier
acquired shares with full voting rights, this subsection provides that
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the voting power of all shares up to 20 percent is not affected by this
Article.**Thus, for example, an acquiring person under the Indiana
statute who, for reasons that are entirely immaterial to the purposes
of the statute, goes from 13 percent to 21 percent shareholdings within
the applicable 90-day period, loses the voting power of all shares
except the previously acquired 13 percent; the result for the same
shareholder under the Model Act is the loss of voting power for only
the last one percent. The Joint Committee believes there is very little
utility in trying to identify the transaction that takes an acquiring
person over the threshold and to sterilize the shares involved in that
transaction. Under the Model Act, the voting power of control shares
representing voting power of less than 20 percent may be exercised,
except (as the introductory phrase cautions) in connection with the
approval vote.
(c) If control shares of the acquiring person previously have
been accorded the same voting rights they had before they became
control shares pursuant to the procedure set forth in Section 5, or if
such control shares were acquired in a transaction excluded from the
definition of "control share acquisition," then only the voting power
of shares acquired in a subsequent control share acquisition by such
acquiring person shall be reduced to zero.
Commentary to Subsection 4(c). Another ambiguity the Model Act
attempts to correct is whether the voting power of control shares,
once restored in accordance with the shareholder vote procedure, may
be again eliminated by a subsequent control share acquisition. This
subsection provides that once control shares have been accorded by
shareholder vote the same voting rights they had before they were
originally sterilized, or if such control shares were acquired in an
excluded transaction, the shares retain those voting rights even when
the acquiring person exceeds another control share threshold. Thus,
the shareholder approval granted with respect to the voting rights of
a 26 percent holder applies up to 33 1/3 percent, and it is only the
voting rights of shares in excess of that next threshold that are then
** Ohio is the oldest of the state control statutes and, in concept, served as
the original model. The major difference between the Ohio law and those that
followed, however, is that Ohio actually prevents the acquisition of control shares,
and not just the exercise of their voting rights, unless the shareholders grant approval.
This prohibition against the purchase of shares regarded as conveying control was at
the heart of the court's decision in Fleet Aerospace Corp. v. Holderman, 796 F.2d
135 (6th Cir. 1986) holding the Ohio statute to be an unconstitutional interference
with interstate commerce. The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals is now reviewing its
decision in light of CTS.
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reduced to zero. Similarly, shares acquired in an inter vivos gift of 39
percent and the acquisition by the donee of up to another 11 percent
retain their voting rights, even if their owner acquires additional
shares beyond the majority threshold. It is only the voting rights of
shares in excess of that majority threshold that are sterilized. See
subparagraph 3(e)(3)I.
(d) The voting rights of control shares are restored to those
accorded such shares prior to the control share acquisition in any of
the following circumstances: (i) if, by reason of subsequent issuances
of shares or other transactions by the issuing public corporation, the
voting power of those control shares is reduced to a range of voting
power for which approval has been grated or is not required; (ii)
upon transfer to a person other than an acquiring person; or [(iii) the
expiration of thee years after the date of a vote of shareholders
pursuant to Section 5 failing to approve the resolution according
voting rights to those control shares].
Commentary to Subsection 4(d). In addition to the shareholder approval procedure as provided under Section 5 of the Model Act, the
statute permits the restoration of voting power of control shares in
the following circumstances: (1) Where the issuing public corporation
engages in a transaction, such as the issuance of additional shares,
causing the voting power of control shares to be reduced to a lower
range of voting power for which shareholder approval has already
been granted, or for which no approval is necessary (i.e., less than 20
percent); or (2) where the control shares are transferred to someone
whose percentage of shareholdings will not exceed 20 percent; or [(3)
three years have expired after a shareholder vote failing to approve
the voting rights resolution with respect to those shares].
The rationale for the first of these provisions is that the issuing
public corporation is entirely responsible for taking the action that
reduced the voting power of control shares to noncontrol level.
Indeed, if someone else were to acquire the same resulting percentage,
no control share acquisition would have occurred. The second provision merely makes explicit what probably is evident anyway: Shares
that constituted control shares in the hands of an acquiring person
becomes shares with ordinary voting rights in the hands of someone
who has not made and does not propose to make a control share
acquisition. [The third provision is entirely new. It is intended to
deflect criticisms voiced as to other control share statutes to the effect
that perpetual sterilization of control shares is inequitable and confiscatory.]
[The bracketed language in the text of subsection 4(d) and this
Commentary reflects the Joint Committee's inability to reach a clear
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consensus on whether voting rights of control shares should be
restored after some period of time, even where the vote of disinterested
shareholders to do so has failed to gain approval. Those who favor
automatic restoration after three years point to the hardship and
fundamental unfairness of perpetual sterilization of the shares, noting
that three years is long enough to eliminate the coercion and abuses
that can accompany partial tenders and other fractional acquisitions
of control. Those who do not favor the provision argue that restoration of voting rights after three years without approval of disinterested
shareholders is inconsistent with the statute's fundamental purpose,
and would discourage other offers during the three-year waiting
period. In any event, because the Act does not affect the voting rights
of control shares up to 20 percent (subsection 4(b)), acquisition of 81
percent of the outstanding stock provides voting control notwithstanding the sterilization-for three years or forever-of the remaining 61
percent, since 19.9 percent then becomes an absolute majority of the
shares still capable of voting. Because the Committee was divided on
this issue, it was decided to include the proposal in this draft and
seek public comment.]
Section 5. Approval Procedure. (a) Any acquiring person who
proposes to make a control share acquisition may, and any acquiring
person who has made a control share acquisition shall, public and
deliver to the issuing public corporation at its principal office a
disclosure statement. To be regarded as a disclosure statement, the
document must set forth all of the following:
(I)

The identity of the acquiring person;

(2) A statement that the disclosure statement is delivered
pursuant to this Article;
(3) The number of shares of the issuing public corporation
owned (directly or indirectly) by the acquiring person, the
acquisition dates and the prices at which such shares were
acquired;
(4) The voting power to which the acquiring person, except
for Section 4, would be entitled;
(5) A form of the resolution to be considered by the shareholders hereunder; and
(6)

If the control share acquisition has not yet occurred
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A. a description in reasonable detail of the terms of
the proposed control share acquisition; and
B. representations of the acquiring person, together
with a statement in reasonable detail of the facts upon
which they are based, that the proposed control share
acquisition, if consummated, will not be contrary to law,
and that the acquiring person has the financial capacity to
make the proposed control share acquisition.
Commentary to Subsection 5(a). Section 5 follows very closely the
procedure for approval of voting rights of control shares found in
the Indiana statute and many of the other state laws. The Joint
Committee has made few substantive changes, although certain procedural problems and ambiguities of the Indiana law have been dealt
with.
The procedure begins with the publication and delivery to the
issuing public corporation of a "disclosure statement: by an acquiring
person. Unlike the comparable Indiana provision, in order to set the
shareholder voting procedures in motion, this is made a mandatory
procedure on the part of any acquiring person who has made a control
share acquisition, and is optional on the part of a person who proposes
to make a control share acquisition. Of course, an acquiring person
who has acquired no shares but proposes to do so, and who does not
public and deliver a disclosure statement, does not invoke the shareholder voting procedures. The publication requirement (which is not
found in the Indiana law) is designed to prevent an acquiring person
who proposes to make, but who has not yet made, a control share
acquisition from initiating the shareholder voting procedure without
cost or serious consequence to the acquiring person. Such action
might otherwise be employed simply to put the company "in play"
without any real intent to follow through with the control share
acquisition. The publication requirement is intended to invoke Rule
14d-2(b) under the 1934 Act which deems a public announcement of
this type to constitute the commencement of a tender offer for
purposes of Section 14(d) of the 1934 Act. The subsection goes on to
identify the information (which is virtually the same as in the Indiana
statute) that must be included in the disclosure statement. If the
document does not contain all such information, it is not regarded as
a disclosure statement and does not trigger the procedure that follows
receipt of a disclosure statement. But, unlike the Indiana statute,
failure to file a disclosure statement does not establish a redemption
right on the part of the corporation. More generally, failures of
compliance with the procedures established in this section of the Act
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can be remedies like any other breach of statutory corporate law-by
resort to the courts.
(b) If the directors of the issuing public corporation so order, or
if the acquiring person so requests at the time of delivery of a
disclosure statement and gives an undertaking to pay the issuing
public corporation's expenses in connection therewith, a special meeting of shareholders of the issuing public corporation must be called
within ten (10) days after delivery of the disclosure statement for the
purpose of considering the resolution relating to the voting rights to
be accorded the shares acquired or to be acquired in the control share
acquisition.. Unless both the acquiring person and the issuing public
corporation agree in writing to another date, the special meeting of
shareholders must be held not sooner than thirty (3)) days nor later
than fifty (50) days after receipt by the issuing public corporation of
the request or order for a special meeting.
Commentary to Subsection 5(b). Delivery of a valid disclosure statement begins the shareholder voting procedure. A special meeting of
shareholders for the purpose of considering a resolution according
voting rights to the control shares must be called within ten days if
either the acquiring person so requests when delivering its disclosure
statement (provided an undertaking is given by the acquiring person
to pay the costs of the meeting), or if the directors of the issuing
public corporation so order. The Joint Committee feels that the latter
procedure, probably available under most state business corporation
statutes anyway, ought to be explicitly applicable in these circumstances. The timing of the special meeting is designed to coordinate
with time periods prescribed under the federal Williams Act. In
particular, the special meeting must be held within 50 days of the
request, unless otherwise agreed by the company and acquiring person,
in order to fall within the 60-day period after which tendering
shareholders must be granted withdrawal rights under Section 14(d)(5)
of the 1934 Act. The 30-day minimum period, applicable unless
otherwise agreed, permits sufficient time for the solicitation of proxies
and other tasks necessary to prepare for and conduct the meeting.
Both the procedural and timing aspects of this subsection are
structured to be consistent with the Indiana Act's provisions, regarding
which the CTS decision observed: "Unlike the MITE statute, the
Indiana Act does not give either management or the offeror an
advantage in communicating with the shareholders about the impending offer. The Act does not impose an indefinite delay on tender
offers." 107 S.Ct. 1646.
(c) If no special meeting of shareholders is called pursuant to
subsection 5(b), the resolution relating to the voting rights to be
accorded the shares acquired in the control share acquisition must be
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presented to the next special or annual meeting of shareholders.
Commentary to Subsection 5(c). In the absence of a request for a
special shareholders meeting by the acquiring person, the directors
need not call such a meeting and the voting rights resolution will be
presented at the next annual shareholders meeting or special meeting
called for any purpose. This assures that the issue will be considered
by shareholders at the next opportunity, whether or not the acquiring
person wants the process to move more slowly. Control share voting
rights that are approved at one meeting cannot be affected by a
subsequent vote, except as provided in subsection 5(h) involving
competing control share acquisitions.
(d) If a special meeting is called, notice of the special meeting of
shareholders must be given as promptly as reasonably practicable by
the issuing public corporation to all shareholders of record as of the
record date set for the meeting. If the special meeting was requested
by the acquiring person, the directors shall set the record date on a
date not later than 15 days after the request was received by the
issuing public corporation.
Commentary to Subsection 5(d). Notice of a special shareholders
meeting must be given promptly after the meeting is called. The record
date will be established on a date not later than 15 days after the
request for a special meeting was received. This is the date for
determination of whether shares constitute "interested shares" under
subsection 3(f). It may be in the interests of the issuing public
corporation to set an earlier record date, however, in order to try to
reduce the drift of shares into the hands of arbitrageurs and other
takeover speculators whose vote in the approval process may be
dictated solely by short-term considerations. The 15-day period is
intended to facilitate, if necessary, the beneficial owner inquiry provided for in Rule 14a-13 under the 1934 Act.
(e) Notice of the special meeting, or the annual meeting if no
special meeting is called, must include or be accompanied by
(1) A copy of the disclosure statement;
(2) A statement by the board of directors of its position or
recommendation, or that it is taking no position or making
no recommendation, with respect to the resolution contained
in the disclosure statement; and
(3) A description of any dissent and appraisal rights or any
redemption procedure that may accompany or result from the
vote of shareholders.
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Commentary to Subsection 5(e). The notice of the special meeting
must include, in addition to a copy of the acquiring person's disclosure
statement and a position statement of the board of directors, a
description of any dissent and appraisal rights or any redemption
procedure that may accompany or result from the shareholder vote.
Although the Joint Committee determined not to include in the Model
Act either of the latter provisions for the reasons hereinafter discussed
(see "ADDITIONAL COMMENTARY"), some states may choose
nevertheless to insert dissent and appraisal rights and/or a redemption
procedure or may apply general corporate law procedures to this
transaction. And if they do, these provisions ought to be described in
the notice. Of course, if the issuing public corporation is subject to
the proxy requirements of Regulation 14A (which will usually be the
case, the shareholders will receive considerably more information.
(f) Any other provisions of this Article notwithstanding, a proxy
relating to a meeting of shareholders to be held pursuant to this
Section 5 must be solicited separately from the offer to purchase or
solicitation of an offer to sell shares of the issuing public corporation.
Commentary to Subsection 5(f). One criticism of the Indiana statute
and other state control share acquisition laws involved the strategy of
soliciting revocable proxies along with a tender of the shares in the
tender offer. The acquiring person's acquisition of proxies from
shareholders of record who tender has the effect of undermining the
basic premise of the statute-that is, facilitating a collective decision
by the pre-transaction shareholders on a change of control. Subsection
3(f) excludes from the definition of "interested shares" in respect of
which voting power may be exercised or directed solely by the
authority of a revocable proxy. This is to avoid the unintended
consequence of requiring all shareholders to attend in person the
meeting of shareholders, in order to prevent disenfranchisement of
their shares by giving their proxy to an officer or director of the
issuing public corporation. If proxies are to be solicited for purposes
of the approval vote, therefore, both the acquiring person and the
issuing public corporation will be on equal footing in having to make
a separate solicitation.
(g) All votes cast at the meeting for or against the resolution
contained in the disclosure statement must be identified as noninterested shares. To be approved, the resolution must receive the
affirmative votes of a majority of all voting power, excluding all
interested shares. Upon request by the acquiring person, a resolution
that is not approved may be presented again for a vote of shareholders
in accordance with this Section 5 at any subsequent shareholders
meeting and must be presented at each subsequent annual meeting of
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shareholders of the corporation as long as the voting power of the
control shares described in the resolution is reduced.
Commentary to Subsection 5(g). This subsection sets forth the vote
that must be obtained to approve a resolution granting voting rights
to control shares. Unlike Indiana's statute, which requires two separate majority votes in circumstances in which the control share
acquisition would effectuate changes in classes of shares, the Model
Act calls for one affirmative a majority vote in all cases. The sole
voting requirement is a majority of all voting power, excluding all
shares owned by the acquiring person or any officer or director/
employee of the issuing public corporation. The Joint Committee
considered and rejected the inclusion of the second shareholder vote
requirement provided for in the Indiana Act (consisting of a majority
of all voting power-that is, all shares authorized to vote in the
election of directors by whomever owned). The Committee concluded
that such a requirement would give undue weight to management
votes and effectively require the acquiring person to purchase the
control shares, rather than use a conditional tender offer. Thus, the
Joint Committee believes it appropriate to determine, by the single
vote provided for in subsection 5(g), the sentiments of shareholders
of the issuing public corporation who are "disinterested" in the
transaction, in the sense that neither the voting rights of their shares
nor their position with the company will be affected by the vote.
The vote of disinterested shareholders to determine whether
voting rights will be accorded control shares is the heart of the Indiana
Act which provided the shareholder protection rationale for upholding
its constitutionality in the CTS case. The Court, contrasting the
Indiana Act with the Illinois statute struck down in MITE, stated
".... [T]he statute now before the Court protects the independent
shareholder against both of the contending parties. Thus, the Act
furthers a basic purpose of the Williams Act, 'plac[ing] investors on
an equal footing with the takeover bidder,"' [citations omitted]. 107
S.Ct. 1645. The Court went on to state: "The Indiana Act operates
on the assumption, implicit in the Williams Act, that independent
shareholders faced with tender offers often are at a disadvantage. By
allowing such shareholders to vote as a group, the Act protects them
from the coercive aspects of some tender offers." 107 S.Ct. 1646.
The theme of collective decision-making on a change of control
was repeated in the CTS decision at 107 S.Ct. 1651 where the court
stated: "The primary purpose of the Act is to protect the shareholders
of Indiana corporations. It does this by affording shareholders, when
a takeover offer is made, an opportunity to decide collectively whether
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the resulting change in voting control of the corporation, as they
perceive it, would be desirable."
Several states have added additional requirements to the approval
of voting rights for control shares (or even convening the shareholders
meeting to vote on the proposition) that the Joint Committee considered and rejected for the Model Act. Four states (Arizona, Hawaii,
Minnesota and Ohio) mandate the consummation of the control share
acquisition within a specified period of time following the approval
vote, or else the vote becomes void. Two of these states (Arizona and
Minnesota) also require that the acquiring person must have definitive
financing arrangements in place at the time the disclosure statement
is delivered or no special meeting of shareholders is called. The Joint
Committee was not convinced of the benefits of these provisions and
did not include them.
The last sentence of the subsection was added to mitigate the
punitive effects of a negative vote. This provision, unique to the
Model Act, not only permits the voting resolution to come before the
shareholders again, it requires annual consideration. The Joint Committee feels this procedure accommodates changed circumstances and
provides fairness to the acquiring person.
(h) (1) For purposes of this subsection 5(h), a "competing
control share acquisition" means a control share acquisition that is
the subject of a disclosure statement delivered to the issuing public
corporation under subsection 5(a) before a shareholder vote has been
held under subsection 5(g) with respect. to a pending control share
acquisition.
(2) A resolution relating to the voting rights of control shares
that are the subject of a pending control share acquisition is not
effective unless it receives approval pursuant to subsection 5(g) and a
resolution relating to the voting rights of control shares that are the
subject of a competing control share acquisition does not receive such
approval. If a resolution applicable to the competing control share
acquisition is approved pursuant to subsection 5(g), only that resolution is effective.
(3) If a resolution relating to a pending control share acquisition
has been approved pursuant to subsection 5(g) before a disclosure
statement with respect to a competing control share acquisition is
delivered, the resolution is effective in restoring the voting rights of
control shares that are the subject of the pending control share
acquisition.
(4) If resolutions relating to two or more control share acquisitions are subject to shareholder vote under subsection 5(g), shares
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held by an acquiring person are not considered interested shares with
respect to a vote on a resolution relating to a competing control share
acquisition.
Commentary to subsection 5(h). The procedure under this subsection
is designed to deal with a "competing control share acquisition''meaning a control share acquisition that invokes the shareholder
voting procedure of an issuing public corporation before the voting
rights of control shares that are the subject of a prior control share
acquisition have been restored. It was borrowed from Wisconsin's
control share acquisition have been restored. It was borrowed from
Wisconsin's initial version of a control share acquisition statute (since
revised) and is not found in the laws of any other state. Under this
provision, once a competing control share acquisition is interjected,
shareholders will be given the right to vote on resolutions relating to
both of them, and only the last one approved by shareholders is
effective (on the assumption that such approval constitutes an implicit
rejection of the resolution relating to the previous competing control
share acquisition). If a resolution relating to a pending control share
acquisition has already received the requisite shareholder vote, however, the later delivery of a disclosure statement with respect to a
competing control share acquisition has no effect on the prior control
shares (which now have been granted full voting rights). Where two
or more unconsummated control share acquisitions are pending, the
shares of an acquiring person are not "interested shares" except with
respect to the vote to restore that acquiring person's voting rights.
They are sterilized, however, at a 20 percent or greater level.
(i) All provisions of [the state business corporations act] that
are not inconsistent with the procedures set forth in this Section 5
shall apply to the meeting of shareholders of the issuing public
corporation.
Commentary to Subsection 5(i). It is intended that nonconflicting
provisions of the state business corporation act will apply, in addition
to the procedures set forth in this Section 5, to the meeting of
shareholders of the issuing public corporation.
Section 6. Special Minority Shareholder Rights. (a) This section
applies to all transactions that, but for subparagraphs 3(e)(3)A and
B, would be control share acquisitions in which
(1) The acquiring person is or includes an affiliate of the
issuing public corporation;
(2) The corporation has, by a provision in its articles of
incorporation adopted within the prior 12 months, elected not
to be subject to this Article; and
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(3) The acquiring person has acquired a majority or more
of all voting power.
(b) Within 30 days after a control share acquisition subject
to subsection 6(a) occurs, the acquiring person must make a
written offer to purchase the shares of each remaining shareholder at a price at least equal to the highest price at which
the control shares were acquired by the acquiring person within
the 12 months immediately preceding the offer.
Commentary to Section 6. This section, which is not fond in
other state control share statutes, is intended to prevent abuses
of the opt-out procedure in Section 4. It was prompted by the
Joint Committee's concern that those who control an issuing
public corporation can deny disinterested shareholders the
protections afforded by this Act and circumvent the requirement for a vote of disinterested shares by bringing about a
shareholders' vote to opt out of the Act as the first step of a
control share acquisition. Without such a provision in the Act,
management would have the power, given its influential role
in the corporate voting process, to accomplish through an
amendment to the articles of incorporation that which it could
not accomplish through a vote of the disinterested shareholders. Particularly whether management already holds substantial voting power, the amendment to the articles opting out
could be effected over the opposition of a majority of the
disinterested shares. This result not only would frustrate the
central purpose of the Act, it might also be viewed as giving
management an unfair advantage over potential acquirers.
To address this problem, Section 6 requires that if an
affiliate of the corporation-one who controls the management
and policies, such as officers and directors-alone or with
others, acquires a majority or more of the voting shares within
one year of a vote to opt out of the Act, the acquiring person
must offer to purchase all the remaining shares at a price no
lower than the highest price paid for the acquired shares by
the acquiring person during the past year. The Joint Committee believes this approach safeguards the rights of disinterested
shareholders without depriving the corporation of the flexibility to opt out of the Act for what might be legitimate reasons.
ADDITIONAL COMMENTARY
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Redemption of Acquired Control Shares. The Model Act does
not provide for the redemption of control shares by the issuing
public corporation. the Indiana law permits such mandatory
redemption, if authorized in the corporation's articles of incorporation or bylaws before the occurrence of the control
share acquisition, within 60 days after the last acquisition of
any control shares by the acquiring person if no disclosure
statement has been delivered to the corporation. the Model
Act, unlike the Indiana Act, makes the delivery of a disclosure
statement mandatory where a control share acquisition has
occurred. Thus, the Joint Committee determined that this
provision is not necessary within the framework of the Model
Act to influence an acquiring person to deliver a disclosure
statement and, in fact, is meaningless in that context.
Furthermore, the Indiana statute, along with those of 11
other states, permits mandatory redemption by the issuing
public corporation, if authorized in the corporation's articles
of incorporation or bylaws before the occurrence of the control
share acquisition, of control shares which are not accorded
full voting rights by the shareholders. The Joint Committee
again rejected this procedure, in that a mandatory redemption
provision of this kind may be regarded as providing a statutory
basis for "greenmail" or "redemption premium" payments
from the corporation to the acquirer which could be ethically
undesirable, financially burdensome to the corporation and
discriminatory to the shareholders. Alternatively, a low redemption price could be set by the corporation, for example
disregarding all recent market price increases, which could be
unfair or even punitive to the acquiring person, notwithstanding that the acquiring person would know, in advance, of the
possibility of mandatory redemption at a price to be determined by the corporation.
[Further, acquired control shares, in any event, will regain
full voting rights within a three-year period under the Act.
Thus mandatory redemption under such circumstances is unnecessary, and is inconsistent with that provision.]
Dissent and Appraisal Rights. The Model Act does not
provide any special dissenters' rights. Indiana and nine other
states offer dissent and appraisal rights under which dissenting
shareholders may receive "fair value" for their shares which
is not less than the highest price per share paid by the acquiring
person in the control share acquisition. The Indiana statute's
special dissenters' rights are available, unless the issuing public

1988:385]

APPENDIX 5

corporation's rights are available, unless the issuing public
corporation's articles of incorporation or bylaws provide to
the contrary prior to the acquisition, if the acquiring person's
control shares give it a majority or more of all voting power.
Payment of the aggregate amount of such "fair value" may
be an unreasonable and burdensome financial obligation on
the corporation to the detriment of both the corporation and
its continuing shareholders. In addition, such special dissenters' rights are necessary to protect shareholders from a newly
dominant shareholder, since the disinterested shareholders, in
voting to return full voting power to the acquirer, already will
have had an opportunity to protect themselves through collective action, as envisioned by the Supreme Court in the CTS
decision.
Notwithstanding the absence or presence of a special
dissenters' rights provision in the Model Act, the corporation
law of many jurisdictions, including Indiana, normally provides dissenters' rights of general applicability. These statutory
procedures usually permit shareholders who register a dissent
to certain transactions that are subject to shareholder vote to
receive the "fair value" of their shares, but without the special
definition of "fair value" that is contained in the Indiana
control share statute's special dissenters' rights provision.
Whether such general dissenters' rights provisions would apply
to a control share acquisition vote, and how those rights would
be enforced, is a matter for determination on a state-by-state
basis. In any event the MOdel Act would not affect the normal
operation of any state's corporation law in this regard, and
general dissenters' rights would be available to the extent that
the state deems such rights appropriate.
21652.
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